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ABSTRACT
DESERT, VIRTUE, AND JUSTICE
FEBRUARY 1998
ERIC F. MOORE, B.A., CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Fred Feldman
I endorse an old view that distributive justice can
best be understood as people getting what they deserve.
John Rawls has several famous arguments to show that such a
view is false. I criticize those arguments, but agree that
more work needs to be done on the clarification and
explanation of the concept of desert in order for the old
view to be more than a platitude. I then criticize
attempted analyses of the concept of desert by Feinberg,
Kleinig, and Miller. I claim that desert must be taken as a
primitive concept. However, even though desert is
primitive, there still needs to be some account of what
sorts of things make a person deserving (what sorts of
things count as desert bases) . Some proposed desert bases
include need, personhood, diligence, moral worth, autonomous
action, and entitlement. I criticize George Sher's work on
autonomous action, diligence, and moral worth, then propose
and defend a modified version of the view that all
legitimate desert bases are either virtues or vices.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
ABSTRACT ***••••••••• V
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION
]_
2. DESERT AND JUSTICE 4
Circularity and Co-Dependence 17
The Common Sense Precepts of Justice 22
Deserving to Deserve 25
Desert and Intuition 29
3. THE ANALYSIS OF DESERT 32
Some Desert Claims 33
The Subjects of Desert 35
The Deserts Themselves 37
Cosmic and Person-Bestowed Deserts 42
Desert as Propriety 46
Desert as Evaluation 54
Desert as Attitude 59
Desert is a Primitive Concept 72
4. EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES 73
Desert and Autonomous Action 73
The Expected-Consequences Account 84
Autonomous Action is Not a Desert Base 97
5. DILIGENCE AND VIRTUE 101
Why the Diligent Deserve the Goods 101
Why the Virtuous Deserve the Goods 112
Desert Bases Cannot be Justified 117
6 . THE VIRTUES 119
The Plurality of Desert 119
Some Notes on the Nature of Virtue 122
The Virtues and Vices 128
vi
7. DESERT AND VIRTUE 133
Problems for the Simple View 137Past Receipts *
-j^q
Insipidity * ’
| 147
Children
**’’*'
150
Other Alleged Desert Bases 153
Entitlement ’ * i 3 g
Conclusion
’
’ igg
N0TE S
BIBLIOGRAPHY 182
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a study of the nature of desert,
and an exploration of the possibility that some significant
principles about distributive justice can be formulated in
terms of it. Here is one principle that I have in mind. It
sets the limit for a perfectly just distribution of goods
and evils.
The Perfectly Just Distribution (PJD)
:
A distribution of goods and evils, d,
over a population of people, p, is
perfectly just during time interval, tl-
t2, if and only if, under d, each person
in p gets what s/he deserves during t 1-
t2
.
John Rawls has argued that no such principle as PJD
could ever be true, because no conception of justice
involving desert would ever be chosen in the original
position. He gives several arguments for this conclusion,
and this dissertation is a response to those arguments.
Most of the arguments he presents are fairly easily refuted,
and I take care of them in the second chapter. However, the
most challenging argument that Rawls suggests against desert
is that desert is too based on intuition to be of much use
in explaining distributive justice. I answer this objection
in the rest of the dissertation, where I examine several
alleged analyses of desert, discuss some of the principal
grounds of desert, and finally present my own principles
1
about desert. Thus, I end up with a viable, desert-based
alternative to Rawls's principles of justice.
In the third chapter I examine several purported
analyses of desert. First, Feinberg's analysis of desert in
terms of propriety, then Kleinig's analysis in terms of
evaluation of the agent, and finally Miller's analysis in
terms of an evocation of appraising attitudes. I
acknowledge that each of these authors points out an
important feature of desert, yet none of those features can
serve to unify the bewildering array of desert claims (even
among those that each author explicitly accepts) . Thus, it
appears that desert is a deep, primitive concept. Examples
can be used to help people "get onto" the concept, but no
explicit analysis can be given. Nevertheless, it is useful
to keep in mind the features pointed out by these authors as
general guideposts to the nature of desert.
Taking desert as a primitive concept does not rule out
saying something of importance about desert. As is evident
from the preceding chapter, there are many possible grounds
for desert. If we can specify which alleged grounds are
actual grounds, then that would further our understanding of
desert. Thus, it will be useful to survey some of the
literature about desert bases. The most extensive treatment
appears to be in the work of George Sher. Sher tries to
provide arguments to show that autonomous action, diligence,
and virtue (among others) are legitimate desert bases. In
2
the next two chapters, I examine his arguments for these
three alleged desert bases. I show that they are all
seriously defective.
Finally, I present my own view about the legitimate
desert bases. I show how my view, that all desert is
closely tied to virtues and vices, takes into account the
features pointed out by Feinberg, Kleinig, and Miller.
However, my account is unifying in a way that theirs is not.
It ties the concept of desert to that of virtues and vices.
Since it does so, some account of the virtues and vices
appears necessary. I try to take a fairly non-committal
view that is open to several different conceptions of the
virtues and vices. However, I do claim that there is an
important connection between the virtues and vices, and
desert bases. I claim that whatever the true virtues and
vices are, those are also the only desert bases (with a
couple of exceptions detailed in Chapter Seven) . At the end
of this chapter, I have answered the most serious challenge
to desert-based conceptions of justice by providing a fairly
plausible account of desert.
3
CHAPTER 2
DESERT AND JUSTICE
In the seminal work of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
,
there is a section called "Legitimate Expectations and Moral
Desert." Rawls here suggests several arguments that might,
if sound, show that justice cannot be explained with
reference to desert. In this chapter, I refute all but one
of those arguments. The last argument is refuted in
Chapter Seven, where I present my view about desert.
Rawls notes that it a common sense view that justice is
distribution according to desert.
There is a tendency for common sense to suppose
that income and wealth, and the good things in
life generally, should be distributed according to
moral desert. Justice is happiness according to
virtue
.
1
Of course, this is probably an unattainable ideal, but
it is what people should at least aim for. Rawls concedes
that this is an often held view; nevertheless, he rejects
it. "Such a principle would not be chosen in the original
position. There seems to be no way of defining the
requisite criterion in that situation." 2
I think these few sentences suggest an argument against
desert based on the choice problem of the original position.
However, before stating the argument, I want to formulate
the desert principle that Rawls rejects. Since Rawls's
approach to the study of justice differs somewhat from the
one I presented in my introduction, the principles in this
4
chapter are formulated a little differently from other
chapters. The major reason for the difference is that Rawls
takes the main subject of justice to be the basic structure
of social institutions rather than the distributions of
goods and evils among the members of a population. The
basic structure of a social institution is composed of a
political constitution and the principal economic and social
arrangements
.
3
"They [the principles of justice] are to
govern the assignments of rights and duties and to regulate
the distribution of social and economic advantages ." 4
Therefore, in this chapter, principles about distributive
justice will have the form, "An institutional framework is
distributively just if and only if..."
Many things can be distributed, but Rawls is interested
in the distribution of primary social goods ('psgoods' for
short) . It is the way that an institutional framework
distributes these that determines whether it is just or not.
Psgoods are primary goods because they are the goods that
"every rational man is presumed to want. These goods
normally have a use whatever a person's rational plan of
life ." 5 Psgoods are social goods because their production
and distribution is primarily controlled by social
institutions. This is in contrast to primary natural goods,
such as health and intelligence, which can occur
independently of social institutions. According to Rawls,
the psgoods are "rights and liberties, opportunities and
5
powers, income and wealth, " and an especially important
psgood is a sense of one's own worth. 6
Using the concepts of institutional frameworks and
psgoods, and understanding virtue as moral worth, the
following principle of distributive justice can be derived
from the passage, "the good things in life generally, should
be distributed according to moral desert. Justice is
happiness according to virtue." 7 Here then is the Principle
of Distributive Justice according to Moral deserts.
PDJm An institutional framework is
distributively just if and only if it
leads to distributions of psgoods in
which each person's receipt is equal to
her/his moral deserts.
Here is the Original Position argument that I think
Rawls suggests.
(1) Persons in the original position would
not choose PDJm.
(2) If persons in the original position
would not choose PDJm, then PDJm is not
true
.
(3) Therefore, PDJm is not true.
Lines (1) and (3) are pretty clearly implied by the
text of §48, but nothing like (2) is mentioned there.
However, I think (2) is the most straightforward way to make
the argument valid, and I think that Rawls would affirm its
truth. He discusses the original position at some length in
§4. There he pretty much states the contrapositive of (2),
"We shall want to say that certain principles of justice are
justified because they would be agreed to in an initial
situation of equality [the original position]." 8 I think
6
Rawls would allow that it follows from this that if a
principle of justice would not be chosen in the original
position, then it is not justified (and so presumably not
true)
.
Rawls's justification for the original position is that
it is a device "to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions
that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for
principles of justice, and therefore on these principles
themselves." 9 Ideally, these restrictions are widely held,
weak presumptions, such as that all parties in the original
position have equal rights in formulating, defending and
choosing principles. 10 Rawls attempts to show that of the
conceptions of justice up for consideration, only his two
principles of justice are fully consistent with a complete
statement of the original position. Therefore, they would
be chosen. 11
The explanation for premise (1) requires appeal to the
substance of the original position. Putting aside the
acceptability of premise two for the moment, it seems that
to establish the truth of (1), Rawls needs to show that a
full statement of the original position will lead to the
rejection of PDJm. Three of the twelve elements that
summarize the original position seem most relevant to this
job. 12 Keeping Rawls's numbering, they are,
(7) Knowledge and Beliefs: The choice of
principles is made from the standpoint
of the veil of ignorance. 11
7
( 8 ) Motivation of the Parties: The parties'
motivation is characterized as mutual
disinterestedness
.
14
(9) Rationality: Each person in the
original position is assumed to be
rational in the following sense. S/he
takes effective means to her/his ends
with unified expectations and objective
interpretation of probability. 15
A person chooses so to speak, "from behind" the veil of
ignorance when the following conditions obtain. She chooses
without knowledge of particular facts about herself, such as
what is her class position, income level, wealth,
intelligence, strength, talents. Nor does she know her own
rational life plan, what social class she lives in, nor even
details of her psychological makeup. She does know general
facts about human sociology, such as principles of economic
theory and human psychology. 16
The parties' mutual disinterestedness amounts to this:
each bargains to get as much psgoods for himself as
possible, but without envy. "The parties do not seek to
confer benefits or to impose injuries on one another; they
are not moved by affection or rancor." 17
Lastly, Rawls claims the rationality presupposed here
is the standard model from social theory. Each person wants
to advance her own interests. But she does not know what
those are, so she goes for as much of the psgoods as she can
get. Then, no matter what her rational life plan is, she
will be in as good a position as is possible to achieve it.
"[The parties] know that in general they must try to protect
8
their liberties, widen their opportunities, and enlarge
their means for promoting their aims whatever these are ." 18
From these three elements of the original position, it
seems possible to argue why PDJm would not be chosen there.
As I quoted above, Rawls says, "There seems to be no way of
defining the requisite criterion in that situation ." 19 Then
on almost the next page, he says "The idea of rewarding
desert is impracticable ." 20 The context here is a
discussion of how hard it would be to figure out how much of
a person's good fortune arises from his hard work, and how
much from his natural abilities (which he does not deserve)
In short, it appears that PDJm is not practical
.
21 It would
not be possible to construct an institutional framework that
would be able to make the delicate judgments of moral worth
required for the distributions of psgoods. Since the
persons in the original position are rational, and have
general knowledge about human nature, they know that it is
often difficult, if not impossible, to figure a person's
actual moral worth. This is independent of knowing what
makes for moral worth, a thorny philosophical problem in its
own right. Since an institution has to actually distribute
the psgoods, it must make some determination of what each
person's moral worth actually is. This certainly seems very
unworkable. Thus, it is easy to envision the participants
in the original position rejecting PDJm.
9
Rawls mentions this practicality criterion in two other
places as a reason to reject possible PDJ's. The first
place is the last paragraph of §24:
... one conception of justice is to be preferred
to another when it is founded upon markedly
simpler general facts, and its choice does not
depend upon elaborate calculations in the light of
a vast array of theoretically defined
possibilities. 22
Rawls puts this forward as one reason to favor his two
principles of justice over classical utilitarianism. 23 It
sounds like Rawls is here borrowing a widely used criticism
of classical utilitarianism in the realm of morality, and
adapting it to the arena of justice. The criticism of
classical utilitarianism is that no one could ever calculate
all the utilities required to evaluate a course of action,
so at least in many cases, a person cannot determine which
of her several alternatives is morally permissible. If
classical utilitarianism was adopted in the original
position, then the institutional framework would have to
regulate distributions the choice of which would "depend
upon elaborate calculations in the light of a vast array of
theoretically defined possibilities." Clearly this would be
highly impractical, and so one reason to prefer Rawls’s
principles to classical utilitarianism.
The second place Rawls appears to use the
impracticability criterion is in §47:
No attempt is made to define the just distribution
of goods and services on the basis of information
10
about the preferences and claims of particularindividuals
,
24
One reason is that such information is not available in
the original position, but Rawls goes on to say,
. . . and in any case, it introduces complexities
that cannot be handled by principles of tolerable
simplicity to which men might reasonably be
expected to agree. 25
It sounds like he is saying that very complex
principles would not be accepted by persons in the original
position. But surely not just because they are complex, or
because a certain amount of time is required to grasp their
implications. After all, Rawls's own two principles take
much of his book to be explained. They seem pretty complex
to me. So it seems to me that the reason that Rawls claims
such principles would be rejected is not just their
complexity, but instead because of the difficulty of putting
them in practice. In this case, it would be very difficult
to actually find out each person's preferences and claims in
order to figure out how much psgoods each should get. So it
seems reasonable to take Rawls as claiming that certain
complex PDJ's are impractical, and so wouldn't be chosen in
the original position.
So it appears that again and again Rawls uses a
criterion of practicality to judge PDJ's. Perhaps this can
be justified from the original position in light of the
stated aim of (9), that rational people attempt to take
effective means to achieve their aims. 26 It is plausible
11
that it would be hard to set up institutional frameworks so
that they would effectively track individual preferences and
claims, or calculate the long-term utilities of a variety of
alternatives, or accurately take into account a person's
moral worth. This seems to be ample reason to believe
premise (1) of the Original Position argument.
However, I think these considerations miss the point of
deliberation about PDJ's. The point is to formulate true
principles of justice, not merely to formulate principles
that are practical for use in distributing psgoods among
large numbers of people. The quest is for principles that
reveal general justice-making properties, not for principles
that will easily be enforced by some standard legal system.
It seems to me that this latter task is a matter for
economists, political scientists and legal scholars. One of
their tasks is to figure out how to get institutional
frameworks to embody PDJ's. This is certainly no small
problem, and is just as important as the one I take myself
to be embarked upon. Still, I think their emphasis is
different. They presuppose some theoretical conception of
justice, and then try to figure out how to construct the
constitution of a country to bring about this justice,
whereas Rawls and myself are working on the theoretical
conception itself. Note that Rawls cannot accuse me of
being "overly ideal." That is, he cannot consistently fault
a theory that shows what the ideals of a perfect social
12
system are without giving us much insight into how such a
system could be brought into being by an institutional
framework. For he himself limits his theory to a system
where strict compliance holds, and says that, "the nature
and aims of a perfectly just society is the fundamental part
of the theory of justice." 27 Of course there is some
overlap between the tasks of developing a theory of justice
and trying to apply it, but I think it is important not to
place too much emphasis on the practicality of a conception
of justice. Thus, if premise (1) is true, then I reject
premise (2)
;
I do not think that the original position is
the final arbiter of which principles are justified. It
relies too much on practical contingencies. 28
There is another reason to believe that premise (1)
might be true, but it is not suggested by Rawls. Elements
(8) and (9) of the original position state that persons are
mutually disinterested and rational agents. They each try
to get as much of the psgoods as possible. Some have taken
these elements as equivalent to stating that the persons in
the original position are downright selfish. If so, then
this would be reason to suppose that they would not choose
PDJm. Since they know general principles of human
psychology, these agents would know that not too many people
have high moral worth. 29 So each might figure that his
chance of getting as many of the psgoods as he wanted would
be diminished were he to get only the amount of psgoods that
13
corresponded to his moral worth. it seems that persons in
the original position would agree on this at least: none
wants to see goods distributed according to moral worth.
But this seems to point out another defect of the original
position. For if a bunch of greedy tightwads agree not to
choose PDJm, this seems an argument for it rather than
against. Thus one who accepted premise (1) because it seems
that the original position requires selfish behavior, would
probably reject premise (2)
.
It would seem to such a one
that selfish people cannot conceive of justice. 30
Rawls considers and rejects this objection. He points
out that though persons are mutually disinterested in the
original position, that has no bearing on their character
traits in the real world. 31 Also, though the agents are
mutually disinterested, they are not envious. "He is not
downcast by the knowledge or perception that others have a
larger index of primary social goods." 32 Furthermore,
though the agents may be selfish, they still will comply
with whatever is agreed upon in the original position, and
each knows this of each other. This is the strict
compliance requirement. So selfishness will not cause one
to try to get away with disobeying a PDJ. Finally, it is
unlikely that Rawls would agree that general principles of
human psychology imply that most people are selfish. He
would probably argue that the principle, if true, is not
general or universal enough to make it through the veil of
14
ignorance. It is probably just a contingent fact due to the
way our social system operates, and persons in the original
position do not know anything about their societies in the
real world. Thus, an agent in the original position would
not be making any guesses about the probability of her being
selfish in the real world. At any rate this seems to be
just the kind of contingent knowledge that Rawls wants to
rule out with the veil of ignorance. He argues that because
the agents are operating without knowledge of specifics,
their selfishness does no harm. The fact that each agent
operates from the motive of mutual disinterestedness but
from behind the veil of ignorance "forces each person to
take the good of others into account ." 33 Though each person
wants the best for himself, he knows so little about who he
is that the only way to accomplish this is through making
sure everyone is as well off as possible.
I think that Rawls has here missed some subtle ways in
which selfishness can affect people's behavior, even behind
the veil of ignorance. Michael Slote also thinks the
stipulation that people in the original position are selfish
is a mistake, because if the people there are faced with a
hard lot, they may rather accept an unjust principle that
helps them rather than a just principle that does not help
them . 34 To see how selfish people could choose differently
than altruistic people, even from behind the veil of
ignorance, imagine that they are faced with a choice between
15
two sets of principles about justice. Imagine that under
the first set of principles, institutions will be set up to
distribute the psgoods so that fifty percent of the people
will be moderately well off, twenty-five percent of the
people will be very well off, and twenty-five percent of the
people will not be well off at all, but will suffer a fair
amount. Under the second set, everyone will be roughly
equally well off, and a little better off than the
moderately well off people under the first set. An
altruistic person might very well prefer the second set of
principles, because no one in that state would suffer much
more than anyone else (as far as distribution of the psgoods
is concerned) . But a selfish, rational risk-taker might
well prefer the first set of principles. She might reason
that the risk of being in the worst-off group is adequately
offset by the risk of being in the best-off group, and that
the overall chances of landing in a good or very good
situation versus a bad situation are three to one. Since
she is selfish, so long as she is not in the worst-off
group, she will not be very concerned about the people who
are in that group. Thus, it seems to me that the
selfishness of the people in the original position is a good
reason to think that the principles chosen by those in the
original position are not necessarily the just principles.
16
Circularity and Co-Dependence
Rawls suggests another argument against moral desert.
He says,
. . . the concept of moral worth does not provide afirst principle of distributive justice. This isbecause it cannot be introduced until after the
principles of justice ... have been acknowledged
.
35
Note that in this passage, Rawls writes of moral worth, but
earlier, he wrote about moral desert . I think this is
because Rawls has the view that desert is determined by
moral worth. Thus, since justice is determined by desert,
and desert is determined by moral worth (on his view)
,
if
there is a problem with moral worth, then there is a problem
with desert (which Rawls often describes as moral desert, I
think because of his view that moral worth determines
desert)
.
Now, Rawls says moral worth is defined as having a
sense of justice. "We have now defined this notion in terms
of the sense of justice, the desire to act in accordance
with the principles that would be chosen in the original
position ." 36 Rawls's talk of definitions might suggest that
he thinks there is a formal circularity in PDJm. But Rawls
never actually uses the term 'circular'; in any case, PDJm
is not a definition, it is a substantive principle, so it
cannot be formally circular. Only definitions can have that
property. Nevertheless, there is a kind of circularity
(perhaps 'co-dependency' is a better term) that principles
can have, and while their having it does not show them
17
false, it does significantly decrease our philosophical
interest in them. Here are three principles that I think
are co-dependent: PDJm, MW1 and SJ1.
PDJm An institutional framework is
distributively just if and only if it
leads to distributions of psgoods in
which each person's receipt is equal to
her/his moral deserts.
I think that MW1 and SJ1 (below) embody the sense of
moral worth that Rawls discusses in the following passage
about a well-ordered society. Also, it is important to
remember that Rawls thinks that desert is determined by
moral worth.
Its members also have a strong sense of justice,
an effective desire to comply with the existing
rules... We have now defined this notion [moral
worth] in terms of the sense of justice, the
desire to act in accordance with the principles
that would be chosen in the original position. 37
MW1 A person has moral worth equal to the
strength of her/his sense of justice.
SJ1 The strength of a person's sense of
justice is determined by how often s/he
succeeds in acting in accordance with
the true PDJ's. 38
The three principles are co-dependent in the following
sense. One cannot determine which institutional frameworks
are just unless one knows the desert of each person. Since
the desert of each person is determined by the moral worth
of each person, one cannot determine the moral desert of a
person unless one knows the strength of that person's sense
of justice. One cannot determine the strength of a person's
sense of justice unless one knows (among other things) which
18
institutional frameworks are just. But the question of
which institutional frameworks are just is the one that
started the whole process. Thus, it appears that a person
cannot come to know which institutional frameworks are just
by studying PDJm, MW1, and SJ1. Yet that was the purpose of
formulating them. Here is a Co-Dependency argument that
incorporates this reasoning.
(1) PDJm, MW1 and SJ1 are co-dependent.
(2) If (1), then PDJm cannot be a first
principle of distributive justice.
(3) Therefore, PDJm cannot be a first
principle of distributive justice.
Though I think (1) is justified, the only way to get to
the conclusion seems to be by (2), and that line is very
weak. First of all, since it is the three principles that
together are co-dependent, it is not clear why PDJm should
be the one to go. Since the co-dependency would be broken
if any one of the three principles were given up, I would
rather choose MW1 or SJ1. In fact, I think MW1 is highly
implausible as an account of moral worth. Having a sense of
justice is surely an important factor in determining moral
worth, but just as surely it is not the sole factor. It is
possible to be too motivated by justice, and we would say of
one who is justice-motivated to the exclusion of other
feelings, "he was just but hard-hearted in his refusal to
ever grant mercy." Imagine this guy had many chances to be
just, and many chances to be merciful, and assume that in
all those cases he could not be both. 39 If he always chose
19
the just when he had the chance, and never chose the
merciful, then though his sense of justice contributed
positively to his moral worth, I think his lack of mercy
contributed negatively to it. There are other gualities
besides mercy and justice which contribute towards a
person's moral worth: compassion, forgiveness, honesty,
conscientiousness, diligence, etc. However, I think there
is a trivial revision of MW1 which will seem far more
plausible, and yet still let the argument go through. Here
it is
.
MW2 A person's moral worth is partially
determined by the strength of his/her
sense of justice.
So long as the sense of justice is at all important to
moral worth, there will be co-dependency among the
principles, because determining moral worth will rely, at
least in part, on knowing which institutional frameworks are
just. Since MW2 is plausible, and PDJm is not to be
abandoned until necessary, that means that there is one last
solution. Give up S J1
.
In fact I think SJ1 is implausible, so I am happy to
give it up. When Rawls presents his "definition" of moral
worth, he does so in the context of an ideal social system,
whose members are lucky enough to know which principles were
chosen in the original position, and are also lucky enough
to know that whatever principles get chosen in the original
position are true. For such individuals, it may be that SJ1
20
is correct about the conditions for the possession of a
sense of justice. But we are not in that situation, and
likely no one will ever be in that situation. We do not
know what the true PDJ's are for certain, in the way that
those in Rawls's ideal social system would. So I think that
to have a sense of justice it is not required that a person
act in accordance with the true PDJ's. It is enouqh that
the person act in accordance with what s/he rationally
believes to be the true PDJ's. After all, it makes sense to
speak of a person from a different country than one's own
(whose members have a different perception of the just)
,
as
having a sense of justice.
I think a person can have the virtue of honesty even on
occasions when that person mistakenly gives you
misinformation. 40 So long as the correct intent was there,
and the person had good reason to believe he was right, I
would accept his misinformation as "an honest mistake."
Similarly, a person can have a sense of justice without
always acting justly. So I would replace SJ1 with SJ2 as
stated below.
SJ2 The strength of a person's sense of justice
is determined by how often s/he succeeds in
acting in accordance with what s/he
rationally believes to be the true PDJ's.
With this revision of SJl I have achieved two
principles that I think capture an important element of
moral worth: MW2 and SJ2. Furthermore, they are not co-
dependent with PDJm. Thus, I think that when it is
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correctly formulated, by substituting MW2 for MW1 and SJ2
for SJ1, the first premise of the Co-Dependency argument is
false. This argument has not shown that PDJm must be
rejected as a candidate for a first principle of justice.
The Common Sense Precepts of Justice
In §47 Rawls considers whether his two principles of
justice (PDJr ) satisfy "our intuitive ideas of what is just
and unjust. In particular we must ask how well it accords
with common sense precepts of justice." 41 Rawls thinks that
although he has so far ignored the common sense precepts in
his formulation of PDJr, it nevertheless accounts for
them. 4 ^ Here are some of the common sense precepts of
justice that Rawls discusses.
CPJc Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her contribution. 43
CP Jt Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her talent. 44
CPJn Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her need. 45
CPJe Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her conscientious effort. 46
By the end of §47, I think Rawls is satisfied that RPJ
accounts for the CPJ's as much as it needs to. He has also
argued that none of the CPJ's could be elevated to the
status of a first principle of justice. 47 It is plausible
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that here Rawls is presenting moral desert not as a first
principle of justice, but as a common sense precept.
There is a tendency for common sense to suppose
that income and wealth, and the good things in
life generally, should be distributed according to
moral desert. 48
Here is PDJm expressed as a common sense principle rather
than as a first principle of justice.
CPJm Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her moral desert.
Expressed in this form CPJm is covered by Rawls's
argument in §47, that no CPJ could plausibly be raised to
the status of a first principle of justice. Here is one way
that the Non-Accommodation of CPJ's argument can be
formulated.
(1) Any true first principle of justice must
account for all our CPJ's.
(2) PDJm does not account for any CPJ other
than CPJm.
(3) Therefore, PDJm is not a true first
principle of justice.
I already presented the passage where Rawls assented to
(1) above, and in any case it seems a plausible premise.
Rawls presents a couple of reasons to believe (2)
.
First,
he shows that PDJm and CPJc conflict. According to CPJc, a
person's receipt should match her contribution to the social
system. But the amount a person contributes is partly
regulated by supply and demand. Clearly a person's moral
worth does not vary with supply and demand. "No one
supposes that when someone's abilities are less in demand
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... his moral deservingness undergoes a similar shift." 49
Rawls also points out that PDJm and CPJn conflict. 50 This
seems clearly true. The moral worth of a person seems
mostly independent of his need. It certainly does not vary
with the occurrence of natural disasters though need often
does. So (2) seems true as well. 51 This argument appears
successful
.
However, premise (1) of the argument is quite powerful.
It not only shows the implausibility of PDJm, but threatens
the plausibility of RPJ. Here is the Non-Accommodation
Argument Against RPJ.
(1) Any true first principle of justice must
account for all our CPJ's.
(2) RPJ does not account for CPJm.
(3) Therefore, RPJ is not a true first
principle of justice.
Rawls admits the truth of (2) in a discussion of the
conflict between CPJn and CPJm, "Nor does the basic
structure tend to balance the precepts of justice [CPJn and
CPJm] so as to achieve the requisite correspondence behind
the scenes. It is regulated by the two principles of
justice which define other aims entirely." 52 Clearly, if
RPJ accommodates CPJn and CPJc, and these conflict with
CPJm, then RPJ cannot also accommodate it. To reject this
argument, it is not enough for Rawls to show that PDJm is
not a first principle of justice. He must show that CPJm is
false. This is much harder than just showing that CPJm
cannot plausibly be raised to a first principle, and none of
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Rawls’s arguments I have so far examined, even if sound,
would seem sufficient to the task. They would at most show
that PDJm is not true. However, Rawls does appear to think
that CPJm is false, so I will consider his argument in the
next section.
Deserving to Deserve
Rawls appears to claim that moral worth is not the
correct basis of desert, from which it follows that CPJm
must be false, because CPJm is based on moral desert, which
is based upon the view that desert is determined by moral
worth. Rawls claims that no one deserves the abilities,
talents, or defects that one is born with, "any more than
one deserves one's starting place in society." 53 Certainly
much of a person's character, and moral worth, is determined
by early childhood circumstances: one's family, education,
natural inclinations toward good or evil, etc. These are
things for which one can take no responsibility, and so one
cannot deserve them. Rawls says that a man does not deserve
his superior character because it is in large part
determined by circumstances "for which he can take no
credit." 54 If credit is understood as moral responsibility,
this suggests the following Lack of Responsibility argument.
(1) Our moral worth is determined by our
inborn talents, childhood experiences,
education, and natural inclinations,
none of which we can be said to be
responsible for.
(2) If (1), then we cannot deserve anything
on the basis of moral worth.
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(3) If we cannot deserve anything on the
basis of moral worth, then CPJm is not
true
.
(4) Therefore, CPJm is not true.
The rationale for premise (1) has already been
discussed. Premise (2) seems based on the ideas that desert
requires moral responsibility and that one is not morally
responsible for one s own moral worth. Premise (3) is true,
because CPJm is based on moral worth as the sole basis for
desert
.
The problem with this kind of argument is well noted in
the literature JJ Few philosophers would accept both (1)
and (2). Jb Most of those who accept strict determinism, and
therefore would accept line (1), do not claim that as a
reason to deny moral responsibility, so it is not likely
that they would accept (2)
.
It is standard practice for
compatibilists to base moral responsibility on something
other than freedom from strict determinism. On the other
hand, an incompatibilist who found (2) plausible would
likely reject line (1). Just because your childhood
circumstances contribute to your character, it does not
follow that all decisions are bereft of free will. So while
there is some influence of childhood circumstances on a
person’s moral worth, they are not usually decisive. In the
final analysis, a good portion of a one’s choices stem from
one’s own self. As Nozick points out, one can hardly
believe that Rawls really thinks of persons as just mindless
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automatons reacting to external stimuli strictly according
to how they were brought up as children.
So denigrating a. person's autonomy and prime
responsibility for his actions is a risky line totake for a theory.
. .that founds so much (including
a theory of the good) upon person's choices. 57
In addition, line (2) seems false for another reason as
well. It is not the case that all desert requires personal
responsibility. Imagine poor Jim going about his everyday
life working hard for his money, until one day a bolt of
lightning causes a nearby tree to fall onto his home and
destroy it. He deserves some recompense. But Jim was
certainly not responsible for that tree hitting his house.
In fact, this seems to be an instance that proves just the
reverse of (3): if Jim had been responsible for the tree's
destruction of his house, he would not deserve recompense. 58
So the Lack of Responsibility argument fails. However,
the passage I quoted above from Rawls has suggested a
different argument to some philosophers. 59 It is a more
general argument about the nature of deserving, and does not
mention responsibility or determinism, so it deserves
separate consideration. Alan Zaitchik notes that all
deserving must be in virtue of some justifying grounds; and
that Rawls argues that the grounds of desert must be
deserved as well. Zaitchik takes Rawls to say that if
someone claims desert on grounds that just happen to be
true, then the claim must be false. For the fact that the
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grounds are true of him is "arbitrary from a moral point of
view." Thus,
The man who deserves something must be able to
claim credit, as Rawls puts it, for the ground'sbeing true of him. But this means that he mustdeserve .. .whatever is specified in the ground. 60
Zaitchik formulates the following Infinite Regress of
Desert argument.
(1) All desert must be in virtue of some
ground or other.
(2) X deserves Y in virtue of having ground
Z only if X deserves to have ground Z.
(3) Therefore, no one ever deserves
anything
.
61
The conclusion follows because in order for a person to
deserve something, she must deserve its ground, but also the
ground's ground, and the ground's ground's ground, and so
on. Such conditions cannot be fulfilled, so no one ever
deserves anything.
This is an argument whose conclusion is sweeping enough
that if the argument were sound, my project would be
completely derailed. However, line (2) seems clearly false.
For one thing, to say that a ground needs justification
seems to misunderstand its nature. A fact grounds a
person's desert claim when it justifies it. Nothing more is
needed. Otherwise it is unclear why such a fact would be
said to ground its claim.
It certainly seems that people in ordinary language
speak of desert with the understanding that there are
possible circumstances in which it occurs. Yet if (2) were
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true desert would not just never occur, it would be
impossible. Furthermore, poor Jim's circumstances as I
described above seem to provide a case of desert where the
grounds "just happen" to be true of him. That is the
injustice: he did not deserve to get a tree smashed into
his house, it just happened to him.
Desert and Intuition
While I may have shown that Rawls's project requires
more than just the falsity of PDJm, one might think that
since the non-accommodation argument seems successful, that
PDJm is false, and that therefore my project is scuttled.
But this is not so, for my project does not depend upon
PDJm. My project is to account for justice in terms of
desert. But though I do think that desert is based
primarily on virtues and vices, my view of them is
fundamentally Aristotelian, so my view of desert is more
broad than Rawls's concept of moral desert, which is
determined solely by moral worth. I will show that effort
and need, which are not accounted for according to moral
worth, are accounted for under my view . 62 Thus, I would
present my first principle about the justice of
institutional frameworks not as PDJm, but as PDJd, below . 63
PDJd An institutional framework is
distributively just if and only if it
leads to distributions in which each
person's receipt is equal to his/her
desert
.
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So, if Rawls did show that CPJm is false, then that
would derail some of my particular view about the what the
legitimate desert bases are, but it would not show that PDJd
is false. For though I think that virtues and vices are the
primary grounds for desert, there are those who hold a
pluralist view about the legitimate grounds
.
64 A version of
PDJd would still be left to compete with RPJ.
The last objection to explaining justice in terms of
desert is suggested by Rawls’s discussion of intuitionism.
According to Rawls, intuitionism is the doctrine that,
. . . there is an irreducible family of first
principles which have to be weighed against one
another by asking ourselves which balance, in our
considered judgment, is the most just . 65
Desert-based theories of justice are intuitionistic,
according to Rawls. In his list of alternative theories for
consideration in the original position, those involving
desert considerations are placed in the category of
intuitionistic conceptions . 66 The problem with
intuitionistic views is
. . . the especially prominent place that they give
to the appeal to our intuitive capacities unguided
by constructive and recognizably ethical
criteria . 67
Thus, even if Rawls's other arguments against desert
are unsatisfactory, there is still one final alleged problem
with the concept of desert. If desert is merely a
collection of unrelated intuitive principles, then although
something like PJDd could be a possible alternative view to
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RPJ, or classical utilitarianism, such a principle would not
be especially insightful. We would be using a fairly
mysterious concept, desert, to explain justice, and this
would be of only minor interest.
I do not see this objection as unanswerable, but as a
challenge. The challenge is to come up with a concept of
desert that is at least somewhat unified and explanatory, so
that in PDJd the concept of desert is not more mysterious
than the concept of justice that it is supposed to explain.
The rest of my dissertation takes up this challenge.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ANALYSIS OF DESERT
In this chapter I examine three alleged analyses of
desert. I show that those analyses are either just plain
wrong, or else that although some alleged analysis may
provide a useful glimpse of some aspect of the concept, it
is far too sketchy to be a true analysis. Having shown the
defects of previous attempted analyses, and having no
satisfactory candidate of my own, my only option will be to
take the concept as primitive. Nevertheless, I can give
some original, substantive principles about the concept of
desert (in Chapter Seven), and this will have to serve to
make the concept more intelligible.
The difficulty of the task at hand can perhaps be
better understood when a catalog of some of the main kinds
of various uses of 'desert' has been presented, for it will
show the widely diverse uses to which the word has been put.
Before presenting such a catalog, there is a little bit of
background work about the structure of desert claims to be
done. Consider the claim, "Mary deserves a free lunch."
This claim has a truth value, but before we can begin to
ponder what its truth value might be, we need more
information. The answer to the question, "Why does Mary
deserve a free lunch?" is of primary importance for
evaluating the original claim, that Mary deserves a free
lunch. A "negative" answer to the question why the subject
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is deserving: "No reason, she just deserves a free lunch,"
always indicates that the original desert claim is false.
It is never true that a subject is deserving for no reason
at all. This point is emphasized by several philosophers,
and disputed by none that I have read. 68 Thus the structure
of complete desert claims always includes a subject (the
thing that deserves), a desert (that which the subject
deserves)
,
and a justification or desert base 69 (the alleged
reason why the subject deserves the desert)
.
Given this structure, it can be seen that there are
three main kinds of differences among desert claims: they
can differ with respect to subject, desert and desert base.
Here is a list of some desert-attribute sentences that each
seem typical and noncontroversial
.
70
Some Desert Claims
1. Jones deserves her success; she has
worked hard for it.
2. Smith deserves more success than he had;
he gave it his all.
3. Walters deserves the job; she is the
best qualified applicant.
4. Wilson deserved to be disqualified; he
knew the deadline for applications was
March 1
.
5. Jackson deserves more than minimum wage;
her job is important and she does it
well
.
6. Baker deserves to win; he has played
superbly.
7. Miss Vermont deserves to win; she is the
prettiest entrant.
8. Simpson deserves the death-sentence; he
planned the murder.
9. Brown may have known she would not be
caught, but she still deserves to be
punished.
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10 . Goldman deserves some compensation; he
has suffered tremendous loss from the
murder of his son.
11. Lee deserves a reward; she risked her
life
.
12. Benson deserves some good luck; he is a
fine person.
13. Gordon deserves some good luck; she has
had only bad.
14. McArthur deserves a hearing; he is an
expert on the subject.
15. Cleveland deserves better publicity; it
is an interesting city.
16. That painting deserves to be in a
museum; it is a great work of art.
17 . This problem deserves careful
consideration; a wrong solution could
spell disaster for our business.
18. Legislative bill n. 113 deserves passage
into law; it is fair and just.
19. The villain deserved to be crushed in
the landslide; she had never been
punished for her crimes.
20. Peters deserves to get good weather for
his holidays; he has planned everything
so carefully.
21. Smith deserves a breakthrough; she has
been working at that problem for years
now.
22. Martin deserves to be punished; he lied
to Jackson and Burns about ringing up
yesterday.
23. Nolan deserved the prize for her
efforts; her painting was by far the
best
24. Furthermore, Nolan deserved every bit of
the $500 she got for 1st prize.
25. McKenzie deserves to go to jail; he
robbed that old lady.
26. Furthermore, McKenzie deserved about 5
years jail for his offence.
27. Menzies deserves to be honored; she made
important contributions to Commonwealth
relations
.
28. Furthermore, Menzies deserved at least a
K.C.M.G.
29. Pike deserves $50; that amount was
offered to anyone who climbed this peak,
and Pike did.
30. Haiti deserved the sanctions imposed
upon it; its military government was
illegitimate and corrupt.
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31 . Monkeys, dogs and cats do not deserve
the pain they receive in laboratory
experiments; they are at least near-
persons, and so should be treated
similarly, especially with respect to
causing them harm.
32. American Indians deserve a national
holiday. (From a bumper-sticker.)
The Subjects of Desert
As the length and variety of this list shows, desert
claims come in a wide assortment of flavors, sizes and
colors. Although the subject of a desert claim is most
typically a person, claims (15-18) and (30) present examples
where the subject is a city, a country, a work of art, a
legislative bill, or a problem. In claim (31), the subjects
are "near-persons." Since my interest in desert is
connected to justice, and I think that justice is of concern
primarily among persons, I am willing to ignore claims where
the subject is clearly not a person. Maybe the force of
those claims comes from suitable paraphrases where reference
to the non-person is replaced by reference to a suitable
person. For instance, claim (30), about Haiti, can be
construed as a claim about the actual military leaders— they
are the ones who deserved harm for their illegal ouster of
President Aristide, and the subsequent human-rights
atrocities which they encouraged or permitted. Claim (16),
about the painting deserving to be in a museum, can perhaps
be construed as a claim about the public (understood as a
group of persons)
:
the public deserves access to that
painting (through its being in a museum; it is a great work
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of art and should be seen. However, I do not greatly care
if such reconstructions do not always work. It seems to me
that so long as all the people get what they deserve, then
justice is not furthered or lessened by mere objects getting
(or failing to get) what they deserve. If non-personal
objects do deserve anything, it is not in the important
sense that people deserve, and so has no bearing on justice.
It might be thought that in addition to individuals,
groups should also get what they deserve. My view is that
groups are not entities over and above their members.
Furthermore, a person never deserves anything because of
group-membership alone. Instead, talk about desert due to
group-membership is to be understood as talk about an
individual's desert because she possesses a relevant feature
that makes, or at least helps to make, the group deserving.
For instance, consider Slowpoke, who is a member of a prize-
winning relay team. Suppose Slowpoke did not run a very
good leg, but the team won the race anyway. Clearly,
Slowpoke deserves a share in the prize, because Slowpoke's
efforts, though they may have been slowest, were still good
enough to help the team triumph.
Near-persons are a different story. I think claim (31)
matters to justice. Objects with some but not all of the
attributes of personhood should receive some justice.
Consider two worlds that are the same with respect to the
deserts of humans, but differ with respect to the treatment
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of monkeys. In world A, the monkeys are raised strictly for
the purpose of torturing them to a slow, agonizing death.
In world B, the monkeys are allowed to live life in the
wild, facing natural dangers, but no torture is inflicted by
humans. Assuming that there are no other near-persons
besides monkeys in either world A or B, A is clearly far
more unjust than B. I think that in world A, the monkeys
are not getting what they deserve, and this leads to the
injustice there. This is why I wrote above that justice is
only "primarily" concerned with persons. It is also
concerned with near-persons, and so they are appropriate
candidates to be the subjects of desert claims.
The Deserts Themselves
The things that subjects can deserve are quite varied,
at least at first glance. Anything from "some good luck,"
as in claims (12-13), to "every bit of the $500," as in
claim (24)
.
However, it may seem that all of these various
deserts can be categorized as either something which is
pleasant, or something which is unpleasant. So says John
Kleinig, for instance, "Anything which is pleasant or
unpleasant can be said to be deserved, " and he goes on to
say, "Deserved treatment is not something toward which we
remain indifferent." 71 This seems to echo Joel Feinberg's
position. Here is his view about the various kinds of
deserts
.
They are varied, but they have at least one thing
in common: they are generally "affective" in
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character, i.e., favored or disfavored, pursued or
avoided, pleasant or unpleasant. The deserved
thing must be something generally regarded withfavor or disfavor, even if, in some particular
case, it is regarded with indifference by a person
said to deserve it. If we were all perfect
stoics, if no event were ever more or less
pleasing to us than any other, then there would be
no use for the concept of desert . 72
I see in this passage a proposal about deserts, along
with a little argument to support it. The proposal is
similar to Kleinig's view above, that all deserts must be
pleasant or unpleasant. To show the import of Feinberg's
view, I present here a precisif ication of Kleinig's view;
though I do not mean to imply that Kleinig would or should
accept this as equivalent to his original statement. (I
will speak of states of affairs as the things which may
serve as the deserts of a subject.)
Dl State of affairs e cannot be a desert
for subject S at time t unless e is
either pleasant or unpleasant to S at t.
The problem with Dl is that though a person might be
indifferent to a state of affairs on some particular
occasion, it still can be exactly what the person deserves
on that occasion. For instance, suppose a marathoner learns
of death of his father just before going on to race and win
the Boston Marathon. Because of his grief for his father's
demise, he is indifferent to the accolades he receives. But
he still deserves them. His indifference to the desert does
not change his desert. Feinberg at least makes it clear
that such situations as the marathoner's are to be
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considered legitimate cases of desert. His proposal might
be precisified as follows.
D2 E cannot be a desert for S at t unless e
is either pleasant or unpleasant to most
people, most of the time.
Since most people, most of the time, would find the
accolades given the marathoner pleasant, the fact that in
this one special instance he was indifferent to them would
not affect the appropriateness of the accolades for his
accomplishment
.
One other minor point is that both D1 and D2 treat
positive and negative deserts on a par. That is, for a
state of affairs to be a desert, it must be generally
pleasant or unpleasant--i
. e
. ,
not generally indifferent.
But this has the result that a flogging (an unpleasant state
of affairs) can be at least considered as a desert for a
person's bravery in the line of duty (an action for which
only pleasant states of affairs are appropriate candidates
as deserts) . This seems at least as incorrect as the
proposal that some state of affairs to which the person is
indifferent can serve her/his desert. Thus, I would follow
Scott Hestevold, and treat positive deserts and negative
deserts separately. 73
PD E cannot be a positive desert for S at t
unless e is pleasant to most people,
most of the time.
ND E cannot be a negative desert for S at t
unless e is unpleasant to most people,
most of the time.
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All of these proposals are supported by the little
argument that Feinberg gives, that if we were indifferent to
every event, then there would be no use for the concept of
desert. This is supposed to support the contention that no
state of affairs can be a desert unless it has a pleasant or
unpleasant character. I find Feinberg' s argument
unpersuasive. For one thing, I think that it would prove
too much. It would show not only that the concept of desert
reguires non-stoics, but that all moral concepts, including
the concept of morally right action, judgments of character,
etc., have the same requirement. However, there is a
distinguished tradition that holds that the morally right
action is morally right not because it is pleasant, but
because it is morally right, in the famous words of G. E.
Moore . 74 Even if no event were ever more or less pleasing
to any person, there might still be a use for the concept of
desert: to record the truth about justice. Feinberg
himself makes this point in his discussion of grades as
deserts when he says,
... a grade as such is simply a way of ranking
something ... an appraisal which may be put to some
future uses or may simply be put on the record for
no other purpose than to register the truth . 15
So I do not think that Feinberg has given a reason to
think that perfect stoicism would obviate need for desert.
On the other hand, Feinberg may be making a metaethical
point. He may be simply stating his belief that preferences
determine goodness. He may be a preferentist with respect
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to desert, just as some utilitarians are preferentists with
respect to what they think should be maximized. As a matter
of fact, I would disagree with Feinberg. I would say that
part of what is required of a state of affairs to be a
positive desert, is not that it is generally found to be
pleasant, but that it is actually good. Persons can be
misled as to which state of affairs are good, and they may
erroneously conclude that they have not got their
appropriate deserts when in fact they have. So, though it
is possible for all people to be perfect stoics, and not
find either their good deserts pleasant, or their bad
deserts unpleasant, it is still true that some deserts are
good, while others are bad. However, though I am of this
opinion, I will not argue for it here. Suffice to say that
Feinberg has not given any reason to think that desert is
different from other moral concepts such that one who is not
a preferentist about goodness when considering morally right
action should become a preferentist about goodness when
considering deserts.
Finally, I think Feinberg' s discussion of grades shows
that it is not the case that all desert must be pleasant or
unpleasant, good or bad - in some contexts the deserved
grade may be neutral. The grade simply serves to record the
rank, which may itself be neutral. For instance, although
an "A" is a good or pleasant desert, and an "F" a bad or
unpleasant desert, it seems plausible that there is some
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grade in between which is neither good nor bad, pleasant
unpleasant, but simply neutral. Thus, I think that the
attempt to restrict possible deserts to things which are
either pleasant or unpleasant fails. Partly I think it
fails because I think that goodness is not (or not merely)
pleasure, but even if Kleinig were right about the nature of
goodness, I think he is wrong about the requirement that all
deserts be positive or negative. Some are neutral. So,
when speaking of deserts, I would say, "the person who
does/is good deserves good deserts, the person who does/is
evil deserves evil deserts, and the person who does/is
neutral deserves neutral deserts."
Cosmic and Person-Bestowed Deserts
There is another parameter along which the deserts in
the list of claims above differ. It seems clear that some
deserts are bestowable by persons; for instance, those
deserts in claims (3-5), (8), (10), (11), (14-18), (22-31).
But some deserts, such as those mentioned in claims (12),
(13), (19-21), and perhaps also those mentioned in (1), (2),
(6), (7), and (9-11), seem not to be the kind that are
bestowable by persons. A landslide or bad weather are not
the kinds of things generally under control of people. They
occur whether or not we wish or intend them. Some deserts,
e.g. success, may be partly under control of people, partly
uncontrollable
.
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Feinberg concerns himself only with deserts that are or
could be bestowed by persons. Kleinig’s discussion of
deserts does not rule out "cosmic" desert, that is, desert
that is not bestowed by another person. Indeed, claims (20)
and (21), which mention the deserts "good weather" and "a
breakthrough, " are adapted from examples mentioned by
Kleinig in his article. Most other writers do include
cosmic deserts in their discussion, and Feinberg gives no
reason for his rejection of them. 76 Here is a reason to
think that Feinberg may be correct. Consider two worlds,
very similar in most respects, but quite different in one
significant way. The inhabitants of Sunnyskye are morally
excellent, and also see to it that insofar as possible each
person there gets his or her deserts. In addition, the
people there have good weather all the time. The same is
true of the inhabitants of Naturaldisaster with respect to
moral worth and person-bestowed deserts; however, the
unlucky denizens of that inhospitable sphere are plagued
with frequent hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes and tidal
waves. If cosmic deserts are true deserts, then it is
reasonable to suppose that Sunnyskye-people are deserving of
the good weather they receive. On the other hand, the poor
Naturaldisasterians are not deserving of the terrible
weather that they receive. In fact, they also deserve good
weather, and through no fault of their own do not get it.
So, assuming that the person-bestowed deserts of Sunnyskye
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are the same as those of Naturaldisaster, but that the
cosmic deserts are skewed as outlined here, and a principle
relating the justice of a world to the deserts therein in a
straightforward manner; then it turns out that Sunnyskye is
a more just world than Naturaldisaster. This seems wrong to
me. It is just not true that Naturaldisaster is any less
just than Sunnyskye. After all, the people in the former
world treat each other as justly as do the people in the
latter world. Granted, Naturaldisaster may be less happy,
and we might say of its inhabitants, that they are less
lucky, but this does not seem relevant to the justice that
goes on in that world. So perhaps this example furnishes a
reason why cosmic deserts should be disallowed by a suitable
analysis of desert.
However, someone who does not think that deserts play a
very large role in justice may think that my example shows
that desert should not be used to understand justice. Such
a one may say, "This just shows that desert and justice are
not connected in the way that you think. For though
Naturaldisaster is not less just than Sunnyskye because of
some bad weather, it is still true that the
Naturaldisasterians do not deserve their bad luck. The
deserts of the two worlds are not the same."
My view is that just as there are two types of deserts,
cosmic and personal, so are there two types of justice.
Naturaldisaster is cosmically less just than Sunnyskye, but
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is its equal in personal justice. In some contexts it may
be more useful to consider strictly personal justice (and,
therefore, strictly personal desert)
. For instance, the
framers of a constitution may find it impractical to allow
laws which would punish thieves only in the absence of
natural disasters befalling them.
As the above catalog shows, there are many different
proposed bases for deserts. Conscientious effort, actual
contribution or success, moral worth, beauty, innocent
suffering, bad luck, premeditated evil, need, past receipts,
entitlement, personhood, talent. These are some of the
major proposed bases for desert. Not all these bases are
accepted by every philosopher. Robert Young accepts moral
merit, value of contribution, and effort
.
77 Wojciech
Sadurski argues that effort is the only legitimate basis for
desert . 78 Feinberg says that the desert basis of a prize is
the pre-eminent possession of the skill singled out as a
basis of competition; the desert basis of a grade is the
actual possession to the appropriate degree of the quality
assessed . 79 Several philosophers, including Feinberg, Sher,
Miller and Kleinig, also try to provide more general
analyses of desert bases.
The above paragraph only alludes to the problems that
need to be worked out. What desert bases are there? Is
there a general analysis of the concept of a base? Can it
adjudicate between competing accounts of what bases there
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are? As the discussion of desert bases requires detailed
treatment, I will deal with it in several individual
chapters after this one.
The catalog of desert claims is meant to show the
diversity of such claims. But I do not expect that any
analysis would have to accept all of those claims, so I want
to extract a few that are likely candidates for any analysis
we might encounter. Below I have extracted four claims from
the catalog, in descending order of likelihood that each
would be accepted by most analyses of desert.
1. Jones deserves her success; she has
worked hard for it.
8. Simpson deserves the death-sentence; he
planned the murder.
3. Walters deserves the job; she is the
best qualified applicant.
6. Baker deserves to win; he has played
superbly.
While they are in need of some elaboration, I think
these claims do present some of the strongest evidence for
the importance of the concept of desert. A satisfactory
analysis of desert should either confirm claims such as
these, or if it rules some out, at least shed light on why
each appears plausible at first glance.
Desert as Propriety
In the first paragraph of Joel Feinberg's famous
article, "Justice and Personal Desert, " Feinberg states that
his "direct aim" is to provide an analysis of the concept of
desert; and some twenty-two pages later he writes, "Having
presented this analysis of the concept of desert, I shall
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conclude
. .
.
"
b0 According to Feinberg, desert can be
understood as a certain sort of propriety. "To say that a
person deserves something is to say that there is a certain
sort of propriety in his having it." 81 So an initial stab
at Desert Analysis could be as follows.
DAI S deserves x =df. it is proper for S to
have x.
The obvious immediate question raised by A1 is the
meaning of 'proper.' Feinberg notes that there are other
kinds of propriety than that conferred by desert. For
instance, eligibility and entitlement can confer propriety.
It is by means of contrasting these kinds of propriety with
the kind conferred by desert that Feinberg attempts to
elucidate the analysis of desert.
According to Feinberg, eligibility is a "minimal
qualification, a state of not being disqualified," for some
prize or office. Entitlement is stronger. A person is
entitled to some prize or office when s/he satisfies certain
conditions. Eligibility and entitlement are rules-based
concepts, only applicable when there is an existent set of
rules governing social intercourse. However, to deserve
something, "one must be qualified in still a third sense;
one must satisfy certain conditions of worthiness which are
written down in no legal or official regulation." 82
Take the presidency as an example. To be eligible to
run for president, one must be at least thirty-five and a
U.S. citizen born in the U.S. or one of its territories. To
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be entitled to be president, one must be eligible, and one
must have received the most electoral votes (there are some
other legal methods of becoming president, such as being the
vice-president when the president dies, etc.). But to be
deserving of the presidency, one must (and this list will
vary according to the standards of individual voters) be
intelligent and honest, have a plan for the job, be a
consensus-builder, or be a leader, and so on. These
conditions are not specified by any rule, "At best, they are
conditions ’required' by the private standards or principles
of a sensitive voter." 83 This discussion suggests the
following analyses for eligibility, entitlement, and
desert. 84 The analyses of eligibility and entitlement seem
pretty straightforward, but there are at least two analyses
of desert suggested. I will present both and then discuss
the merits and defects of each. 85
ELG S is eligible for x =df. there exists
some social institution, I; the rules of
I specify that no one who does not
satisfy conditions C shall be allowed to
compete for x; S "participates" in I, 5
satisfies C.
ENT S is entitled to x =df. S is eligible
for x; the rules of I specify that if
one has quality Q, then one gets x; S
participates in I; S has quality Q.
DA2 S deserves2 x =df. S is entitled to x;
there are further conditions, F, not
written down, that constitute the reason
or point of I; S satisfies F.
DA3 S deserves 3 x =df. there exists some
social institution, I; in addition to
the written rules of I, there are
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further conditions, F, not written down,
that constitute the reason or point of
I; S satisfies F.
The difference between DA2 and DA3 is that the former
makes entitlement a necessary condition for desert, and the
latter does not. The textual evidence for DA2 comes from
the sentence, "To deserve something, one must be qualified
in still a third sense ...” 86 This sentence follows a
discussion of how eligibility is a weak qualification, which
is embodied in the stronger qualification of entitlement.
The natural progression would be that desert is the
strongest qualification, which embodies the previous two,
plus something else. DA2 allows us to make sense of the
following statement: "the man who was just elected
president of the U.S. did not deserve it." This would be
true when it was the case that although he won the election,
and so was entitled to the presidency, he did not fulfill
the further unwritten conditions needed for desert.
However, DA2 suffers from two defects, one of which, at
least, is devastating. First of all, DA2 appears to fly in
the face of a statement earlier made by Feinberg, that his
analysis will suggest that, "desert is a 'natural’ moral
notion (that is, one which is not logically tied to
institutions, practices, and rules)." 87 DA2 on the
contrary, does appear tied to rules, because one of its
requirements for desert is entitlement. According to DA2, S
must be entitled to be deserving, and S can not be entitled
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to anything unless there is an institution with rules and S
participates in that institution. The second criticism of
DA2 is even worse. Feinberg makes it clear that it is not
only reasonable to say of someone who actually won the
election, that he did not deserve to, but that it is also
reasonable to say that someone who did not win the election
did deserve to. Yet DA2 does not allow the second type of
statement. According to DA2, to deserve to win, one must be
entitled to win. In other words, to deserve to win, one
must have already won. Thus, DA2 clearly fails to capture
an important part of the nature of desert: that a person
could deserve something without having already achieved it.
DA3 does not suffer from the defects so far discussed
of DA2 . It is not tied to the written rules of an
institution, and it does allow that a person who has not
achieved something could deserve it. However, the
connection between rules and desert is complex, and it is
not clear that DA3 has correctly captured it. For one
thing, DA3 is still tied to social institutions in a way
that it seems Feinberg' s above quotation would not allow.
But I will not try to further resolve the connection between
rules and desert here. Kleinig's analysis, to be examined
next, takes up the issue of raw versus institutionalized
desert claims, and this matter can be put off until then.
DA3 and DA2 have in common the part about desert
requiring satisfaction of conditions not written down in any
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institution's rules. I think I can show that this
requirement is unsatisfactory in an analysis of desert
without having to resolve further questions of the
connection between rules and desert.
First, I think that the requirement for satisfaction of
conditions that are explicitly not written down in the
institution s rules, is defective. Presumably, since we can
talk about cases of desert, it is possible to know what the
point of some institution is. But if it is possible to know
the point of an institution, then it seems that it is
possible to write down that point - even to incorporate that
point into the written rules of the institution. Thus I
think that DA3 is too strict in its requirement that the
desert conditions must be unwritten. As a matter of fact,
they often are unwritten, but that is merely contingent, and
not necessary to the concept of desert. This defect is
remedied in DA4
,
below.
DA4 5 deserves x =df. there exists some
social institution, I; there are
conditions, P, that constitute the
reason or point of I; S participates in
I, S satisfies P.
The defect of DA4 (and all the previous incarnations of
Feinberg's analysis of desert as well), can be highlighted
by the following desert claims.
I. Jones deserves her success; she has
worked hard for it.
II. Lee deserves a reward; she risked her
life
.
12. Benson deserves some good luck; he is a
fine person.
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13. Gordon deserves some good luck; she hashad only bad.
14. McArthur deserves a hearing; he is an
expert on the subject.
19. The villain deserved to be crushed in
the landslide; she had never been
punished for her crimes.
20. Peters deserves to get good weather for
his holidays; he has planned everything
so carefully.
21. Smith deserves a breakthrough; she has
been working at that problem for years
now
.
31. Monkeys, dogs and cats do not deserve
the pain they receive in laboratory
experiments; they are at least near-
persons, and so should be treated
similarly, especially with respect to
causing them harm.
None of these claims is specifically tied to an
institution. So none of these claims could be true given
DA4 . While some of the claims about luck may not carry too
much weight, claim (1) is from my select group of target
claims. It is the type of desert claim made all the time,
so I think that any analysis that disallows (1) must be
wrong. The fact is that many desert claims are not tied to
institutions, as Feinberg noted. The problem is that while
Feinberg originally noted this fact, he seems not to have
sufficiently allowed for it in his subsequent treatment of
desert. I think any attempt to accommodate these desert
claims along Feinberg' s lines will weaken the analysis so
much as to make it useless. For instance, DA5 below.
DA5 5 deserves x =df. it is proper for S to
get x, and this propriety is independent
of any rules, institutions, or
practices
.
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DA5 suffers from two significant defects. First, this
analysis corrects too far the problem of DA4 et al. The
problem with those analyses is that they left out many
legitimate cases of desert that were independent of
institutions. But DA5, while allowing those cases, does not
take account of the fact that some deserts are tied very
closely to institutions. For instance, in competitions, the
awarding of prizes is typically rule-based. Even more, the
competitive activities themselves would not even be engaged
in if it were not for the competition. Consider Carl
Lewis’s four Olympic gold medals in the 1984 Games. Suppose
he deserves them. The propriety of his receiving them just
as clearly is not independent of any institutions or rules.
If there were no Olympics, it would be bizarre to say that
Carl Lewis deserved Olympic gold medals. Indeed, it is hard
to see how he could deserve any kind of athletic award if
there had been no institutionalized competition so that he
would make the effort to develop his skills and prove he was
the best. One of the truisms of professional football is
that on any given day, any given team can beat any other.
So it seems sensible that at least part of the desert for
winning a game comes from having actually won it. This is
not always the case, but I think it is generally the case,
or we would not need to use games to determine which team
deserves the Super Bowl trophy each year.
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So DA5 fails to account for a considerable class of
institutionalized deserts. But its second failing is even
worse. DA5 analyzes one opaque concept (desert) in terms of
another concept that is no less opaque (propriety)
. It is
not at all clear what kind of propriety it is that
constitutes desert. The only information about propriety
given in DA5 is that it is supposed to be independent of
institutions, and that is not even quite correct. Thus,
while we may have some better ideas about desert, we do not
have enough to claim a satisfactory analysis. I will turn
to other philosopher's writings to try to shed more light on
the subject.
Desert as Evaluation
John Kleinig notes that some desert claims arise only
in rules-based contexts, while others arise in contexts
which could not be said to have such a connection to rules.
The former he characterizes as institutionalized desert
claims, while the latter are raw desert claims. 88 However,
Kleinig thinks that the two types of desert differ only in
the fact that "institutionalized desert claims at least
implicitly prescribe a dispenser of deserts," whereas the
responsibility for fulfilling raw desert claims does not
rest on any particular person or authority. 89 In fact,
Kleinig claims that desert is not created by satisfying
conditions of a legal system. Anyone who thinks they are,
is confusing desert with entitlement. 90 Thus Kleinig'
s
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analysis should work for desert claims both in institutional
and in non-institutional settings. Below is my
interpretation of Kleinig's analysis of desert, but let me
note first the textual evidence for this analysis. Kleinig
starts talking about "the analysis I have given, " the
paragraph after he says.
We can now state more clearly the type of grounds
[B) by virtue of which X is said to deserve A.
These must be such as evaluate (at least
implicitly) the characteristics possessed or
things done by X. 91
Again, at the start of Section V, he says,
So far I have suggested ... of a certain subject,
X, that it deserves A, where A is a form of
pleasant or unpleasant treatment, when X possesses
characteristics or has done something, B, which
constitute a positive or negative evaluation of
X. 92
I have taken my reconstruction particularly from this second
statement
.
DA6 S deserves x =df. x is a form of
pleasant or unpleasant treatment; S
possesses characteristics or has done
something, B, which constitute a
positive or negative evaluation of 5.
Before discussing this analysis in depth, I would
change the part about pleasant or unpleasant treatment,
along the lines of what I said above (p. 38) about what
kinds of limits there are on the things that can be
deserved. This requires a minor change in the part about
what kind of evaluations there can be, consistent with what
I noted from Feinberg's discussion of grades, also discussed
above (p. 41)
.
Here is the revised analysis.
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DA7 s deserves x =df. S possesses
characteristics or has done something,
B, which constitutes an evaluation of S.
The difference between DA6 and DA7 takes account of my
belief that evaluation of a thing is not only positive or
negative, but can be neutral, and that the deserts can match
the evaluation. They too can be either positive, negative,
or neutral.
DA7 makes clear what might have been obscured in DA6,
that the desert, x, is not connected to the evaluation of S.
In DA6, the only reason x is in the analysand is to put a
limit on what form it can take. Once that limit is removed,
as in DA7
,
then it becomes clear that more is needed for the
analysis of desert. In a desert claim, it seems that there
is some special connection between x and S's past actions or
characteristics, such that in some sense they "match."
Although I have used vague language here, the idea should be
fairly clear. It is that expressed when we say "the
punishment should fit the crime, " expanded to take account
of a wider variety of states of affairs than just those
where crimes have been committed.
To return to the Carl Lewis example that provided so
much trouble for Feinberg's attempted analysis, it does at
least appear that Kleinig's analysis has no problem with
institutional deserts. Since evaluations can take place in
both institutional and non-institutional settings, DA7 can
take account of both institutionalized and raw desert
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claims. To say that Carl Lewis deserved his four Olympic
gold medals in 1984 is, according to DA7, to say that Carl
Lewis possessed certain characteristics, or did something,
which constituted an evaluation of himself. In this case,
the evaluation took place in an institutional setting. So
far, so good for DA7
. However, this case provides a
concrete example of the above-mentioned deficiency of DA7
.
The analysis does not make it clear why, or even that, Carl
Lewis deserved four Olympic gold medals, as opposed to
anything else. After all, in each of the events for which
Lewis got the gold, there were several other people who did
not get gold. Yet, each of the other competitors was in a
situation where what he did constituted an evaluation of
himself. So each of them deserved something, too. DA7 does
not provide an answer to the question of why the other
competitors did not deserve gold medals just as Carl Lewis
did.
So it seems to me that DA7 is not a full analysis of a
desert claim such as, "S deserves x." Rather it is an
analysis of the claim, "S is deserving." It should be
reformulated thus:
DA8 S is deserving =df. S possesses
characteristics or has done something,
B, which constitutes an evaluation of S.
This is a better analysis than those suggested by
Feinberg, since the concept of evaluation is not nearly so
opaque as the concept of propriety, or desert. So DA8 does
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However,
perhaps shed some light on the nature of desert,
as Kleinig himself points out,
...if the claims of justice are to be fulfilled,
then not only the question of whether a person
ought to get rewarded, punished, compensated,
etc., but also the question of how much he ought
to get, must be settled by desert
considerations.
. .
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However, even without a full analysis of "S deserves
X, " there seem to be some significant problems with
Kleinig' s approach. First of all, Kleinig' s use of the word
'evaluation' is fairly broad. Suppose I steal some money
from an innocent bystander. It seems clear that I deserve
punishment. So, on Kleinig' s view, my theft must have
constituted an evaluation of me. But this is surely a non-
standard use of 'evaluation.' Of course, it may seem fairly
obvious that I deserve punishment for my crime, but the act
of theft itself is not an evaluation. The evaluation is
something extra. It is a judgment about my theft (or about
my character) . In any case, the evaluation is an act of
judgment that is made about the theft. It is not the theft
itself
.
Furthermore, it would appear that a person can be
deserving even when the person has not done anything that
could be even broadly construed as a self-evaluation. Let
us return to the case of poor Jim, whose house was smashed
by the lightening-felled tree. It is hard to say that in
this circumstance, Jim did anything that would constitute a
self-evaluation. Thus, it is hard to say why, given DA8, we
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should think that Jim is deserving of compensation. Yet he
does appear to deserve something for his house
.
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There is something about Kleinig's approach that is
consistent with my own view that desert bases are primarily
virtues and vices, since it is often on the basis of virtues
and vices that a person's character is evaluated. So, my
bases would constitute, in Kleinig's terms, an "evaluation"
of the person. However, unless we are naturalists about
moral properties, we will not be able to simply "read off"
the evaluation from the action. The judgment will be added
by the observer according to her or his moral scheme.
Perhaps I am unfair in my criticism of Kleinig's
approach. You might think that though it is not literally
true that your acts are an evaluation of yourself, it is
true that they provoke evaluations in others (and, on
occasion, in yourself as well); and this is what Kleinig's
approach emphasizes. I cannot disagree with this. However,
to say that your actions provoke evaluation in others hardly
seems to get at the core of desert. After all, much, if not
all, of what we do provokes evaluation by people. No one
would claim that desert is not an evaluative concept. Thus,
this construal of Kleinig appears too broad to be of much
help
.
Desert as Attitude
David Miller develops his analysis of desert along
lines similar to Feinberg's and Kleinig's. His analysis
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includes concepts of fittingness, evaluation, and responsive
attitudes. In a passage that I did not include in my
attempted reconstruction of Feinberg' s view, Feinberg says,
...then the kind of propriety characteristic ofpersonal desert.
. .is also to be likened or evenidentified with a kind of "fittingness" between
one person's actions or qualities and another
person's responsive attitudes. 95
Responsive attitudes, according to Feinberg, include
such attitudes as recognition, admiration, the objective
stance, gratitude, appreciation, resentment, disapproval,
remorse, sympathy, and concern. Indeed, Feinberg goes so
far as to suggest that the true deserts are responsive
attitudes, and that the modes of treatment typically counted
as deserts are derivative. They are merely an accepted way
of expressing the attitudes in a concrete form. 96
While it may seem plausible that all cases of desert
involve responsive attitudes as part of the desert, it
hardly seems correct to assert that responsive attitudes are
the sole true deserts. If someone saves my life at some
risk to herself, she surely deserves my gratitude, though it
may not be clear that she deserves anything else. However,
a look at the other kinds of desert claims shows that
responsive attitudes cannot be all that is deserved. For
instance, these desert claims:
5. Jackson deserves more than minimum wage;
her job is important and she does it
well
.
8. Anderson deserves his twenty-year
sentence; he planned the murder.
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While it may be true that in addition to her wages,
Jackson deserves our admiration, or recognition for her
well-performed important work, it is certainly not true that
she deserves only those attitudes. Similarly, though
Anderson deserves our disapprobation for his premeditated
evil deed, he deserves more than just our attitudes. Our
attitudes do not punish him. They do not make him pay for
his wrong-doing. Similarly, our good attitudes toward
Jackson do not pay her rent. She may not even know we feel
them. She deserves the money.
It might be thought that I am not doing justice to
Feinberg's claim. Feinberg never claimed that people do not
deserve more than attitudes. He only claimed that the modes
of treatment are "deserved only in a derivative way, insofar
perhaps as they are the natural or conventional means of
expressing the morally fitting attitudes." 97 My view is
that the force of such claims as (5) and (8) is not captured
by any analysis of deserts that views responsive attitudes
as the "true" deserts and modes of treatment as merely
derived from them.
In any case, Feinberg's talk of the nature of what is
deserved does not provide a clear suggestion for an analysis
of desert claims. It seems to be merely a proposed
modification of the view of what kinds of things the deserts
themselves might be. I mention it here because Miller's
analysis makes extensive use of the concept of appraising
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attitudes, which appear to be very similar to that of
responsive attitudes. Because of the similarity of the two
concepts, Feinberg's discussion may support, help clarify,
or at least presage Miller's view, though Miller does not
credit Feinberg's paper in this connection. Here is a
summary that Miller makes about desert.
When we make a judgment of desert, we are judging the
appropriateness of this particular individual, with his
qualities and past behavior, receiving a given benefit
or harm--an appropriateness which is made intelligible
by considering the appraising attitudes that we may
take up towards the person. 98
This summary suggests the following analysis of
desert
.
99
DA9 S deserves x =df. (i) 5 possesses
characteristics or has done something,
B; (ii) there is an appraising attitude,
A, toward S; (iii) A is evoked by B, and
(iv) giving x to 5 would be an
appropriate way to express A. 100
Clearly, appraising attitudes play a fundamental role
in this analysis. Examples of positive appraising attitudes
are admiration, approval, and gratitude. 101 Just as desert
judgments always require a base, so do appraising attitudes.
You cannot admire someone for no reason at all. There must
be some reason for your admiration. Further, the
restrictions on what kind of reasons are acceptable are the
same as the restrictions on what kinds of bases are
acceptable for desert judgments. The reason (or base) must
consist of some feature or past action of the person toward
whom you hold the attitude (or about whom you make the
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desert judgment)
. Miller makes several more key points
about appraising attitudes, which are summarized below. 102
A) It is contingent that people have
appraising attitudes.
B) There is no purpose in our having them,
we just have them because they are
"evoked" by the situation.
C) If there were no appraising attitudes,
then there would be no use of the
concept of desert. The word would have
no meaning
.
103
D) The range of desert bases coincides with
the range of bases for appraising
attitudes
.
E) Appraising attitudes make intelligible
the connection between a desert judgment
and its base.
Note the switch in roles of attitudes from Feinberg to
Miller. Feinberg wrote that responsive attitudes are the
true deserts. Miller does not make this claim. He thinks
that the appraising attitude explains the connection between
a desert claim and its base. Still, this role makes
appraising attitudes more fundamental than desert claims.
Point (C)
,
above, makes this very clear. Desert requires
the attitude, but it is possible (and not ruled out by
Miller) that there could be attitudes without desert.
While not as precise as we might like, DA9 is specific
enough that certain possible desert bases are ruled out. In
particular. Miller claims that entitlement and need are not
true desert bases. In addition to those more controversial
claims, DA9 allows Miller to rule out such possible bases as
belief, preference, and interest.
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Miller thinks that legal rights (entitlements) are not
true desert bases because they do not make essential
reference to the individual's personal characteristics. 104
Needs are disqualified as desert bases because they do not
evoke appraising attitudes. "No one wishes to have them
[needs], or admires others for having them." 105 So needs are
ruled out by clause (iii) of DA9
. Similarly, we do not
admire people for possessing beliefs, preferences and
interests. 100 Thus, they too are ruled out by clause (iii).
The reason that entitlements are ruled out is, I think,
also clause (iii) . But this is not explicitly stated by
Miller. What he does say is that the reason has something
to do with the fact that rights can be apportioned "without
essential reference to personal qualities." 107 The following
example shows why I think that Miller is making an appeal to
the principle embodied in clause (iii) of DA9
.
29. Pike deserves $50; that amount was
offered to anyone who climbed this peak,
and Pike did.
The ostensible base for desert claim (29) is of the
kind that Miller thinks is really just entitlement, and not
a desert base after all. To become entitled to the $50, all
Pike had to do was climb the peak. The offer existed before
Pike decided to climb the mountain, and so falls under the
rubric of claim-rights 108 or legitimate expectations. 109 But
to decide if Pike deserves the $50, "we should have to
investigate several other matters, such as the difficulty of
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the climb," as well as Pike's individual qualities as a
climber. Actually, according to DA9, what matters is
whether Pike's fulfilling the conditions of the offer evoked
an appraising attitude toward Pike. I think that Miller
believes that Pike's fulfilling a contract would not evoke
any appraising attitudes. But his having certain
characteristics, combined with his climbing of the peak,
would evoke such attitudes (assuming certain characteristics
in Pike and the climb)
. That is the reason Miller wrote
that we would need to investigate the rock-climbing in more
detail before we could decide about the deserts. Thus,
entitlement, need, and the possession of interests,
preferences, and beliefs are excluded from desert-basehood
by appeal to the claim that appraising attitudes would not
be evoked in the relevant situation.
Miller's analysis of desert makes an interesting
connection between appraising attitudes and desert claims.
It seems, at least initially, a plausible approach to the
problem. However, I think there are several serious
problems that need to be addressed before this analysis
could be truly viable. The most fundamental problem is the
need for an analysis of appraising attitudes, because of the
amount of conceptual work they do in DA9. I list here three
reasons I think that much more work needs to be done on
appraising attitudes. I will deal with them in more detail
below. First, I do not think that Miller's analysis
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I can
eliminates the possible bases that he says it does,
think of situations where an appraising attitude might very
well be evoked by a person’s beliefs, or by her having
fulfilled a legal contract. Second, I do not see why the
fact that an appraising attitude is evoked is so important.
I have in mind cases where the appraising attitude is evoked
in an evil or sick person. It seems to me that more than
mere evocation is needed; the attitude must somehow be
"appropriate." Third, the information provided by Miller on
appraising attitudes (and summarized above) is not adequate
to characterize which of our attitudes qualify as of the
appraising kind. Even assuming the list of positive
attitudes is exhausted by admiration, gratitude, and
approval, that still leaves negative appraising attitudes to
be covered.
In a footnote, Miller discusses an objection to his
claim that having a belief is not a desert base. He admits
that "I admire him for being a Marxist," is an intelligible
claim. However, Miller deals with this by claiming two
things. First, that there must be some special background,
such as that the person is being persecuted for his belief.
Second, that what is actually admired is not the content of
the belief, but the courage shown in keeping the belief in
the face of that persecution . 111 I think that Miller's
explanation is, in many cases, plausible. However, I think
that it is possible to admire a person for the content of
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her or his belief, and not just for the circumstances under
which that belief is held. For instance, my wife says, "I
love you. You are the best husband in the world," and I am
grateful to her for those beliefs! (The other appraising
attitudes, admiration and approval, are also evoked in me.)
It is not just the circumstances under which she holds the
beliefs, and it is not just the fact that she holds the
beliefs, that evokes my appraising attitudes. It is also
the contents of the belief: that she loves me; that she
considers me the best husband in the world. Again, consider
the Marxist from Miller's discussion. Maybe it is true that
the admiration evoked is due entirely to the person's
courage. But the same person may say, "I approve of him for
being a Marxist," and this approval may be evoked because
the person approves of Marxism. The content of the belief
evokes the approval, even while it is the courage shown in
maintaining the belief that evokes the admiration. In fact,
we approve or disapprove of people all the time based on the
contents of their beliefs, their interests, and their
preferences. This is evident in the way we go about making
friends and choosing the social groups we become affiliated
with. We also feel gratitude, at least in part, for the
contents of people's beliefs. So I do not at all see why
Miller believes that the possession of beliefs, interests
and preferences cannot function as appraising attitude (and
thus also desert) bases.
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Needs are a bit different. It seems unlikely that a
person s being in need would evoke either admiration,
approval, or gratitude. Miller does admit that in an
extended sense of needs, people can be admired for certain
needs, such as the need of love from another human. 112
However, even granting such needs as those, most desert
claims based on needs do seem ruled out by DA9. The
question to be asked here, then, is what justification has
provided for claiming that DA9 is the right way to
go? Instead of claiming that the range of desert bases is
delimited by the range of appraising attitude bases, and
thus ruling out most needs as bases, it might seem that it
should be admitted that the ranges of the bases for the two
concepts only imperfectly overlap. Thus, some desert bases
are not appraising attitude bases, and vice versa. Of
course, if in all other cases but needs, the ranges
overlapped, and if, in addition, appraising attitudes really
"make intelligible" the desert claims, then DA9 would get
the nod. However, I think I can show that there are many
other cases than needs where appraising and desert bases do
not overlap, thus strengthening the case against DA9.
Above I showed that several bases that Miller thought
were ruled out by DA9 actually are not ruled out. The
possession of beliefs, interests and preferences can evoke
gratitude, admiration, or approval. But, at least some
times, it does not seem that the evocations due to those
68
bases are sufficient bases for desert. For instance, I
approve of my friend's interest in chess. But it hardly
follows that because his interest in chess evokes my
approval, he deserves anything. Maybe that is just that
what he deserves is so minor, such as my verbal expression
of approval (he cannot deserve my approval itself, for that
is something that is just evoked - see point (B) above)
.
Nevertheless, there are certain instances where the
attitude evoked clearly does not correspond to a desert
base. For instance, in the case of admiration and approval
evoked in sick, twisted, or evil people. In the past, there
were many evocations of approval and admiration for the
beliefs, interests, preferences, and actions of Hitler and
the Nazis. There are still many today, in the Neo-Nazi and
KKK movements. Such positive appraising attitudes do not
correspond to any positive deserts for Hitler and Nazis!
Indeed, this example brings to light what is to my mind
one of the serious flaws of Miller's analysis: it places
too much emphasis on the attitudes actually evoked by
people. Such attitudes are highly influenced by factors
which a thoughtful moralist would disregard. For instance,
one who accepts DA9 must accept that when the residents of
Massachusetts approved of burning women for witchcraft, that
was their deserts. Whereas these days, since people do not
approve of such barbaric practices, no one deserves to be
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burned as a witch. But surely no one deserved to be burned
for a witch, then or now.
Furthermore, in some cases people can hold the opposite
appraising attitudes at the same time, toward the same
person, evoked by exactly the same characteristic or action
of a person. What evokes Jack's approval is the very thing
that evokes Jill's disapproval. Therefore, the very same
characteristic, described in exactly the same way at all
times, can be a base for both positive and negative deserts.
The absurdity of these claims seems reason enough to reject
DA9.
There is yet another problem. DA9, like the analysis
suggested by Kleinig (DA7 above)
,
does not make any mention
of the deserved (x) in the analysand. Thus it has the same
problem as Kleinig’ s in accounting for how much, and what
kind of thing is deserved given that a certain appraising
attitude is evoked. Miller does have something to say about
this (see point (E) above), "The existence of appraising
attitudes makes intelligible the connection between a desert
judgment and its basis." 113 Since a desert claim includes
what (if not always how much) is deserved, I think that
somehow the intent of what the sentence expresses should be,
if possible, included in the analysis presented. It is not
included in DA9 because I was not certain how to get it in
there, and because the criticisms presented so far do not
depend on its presence or absence.
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Even if I could see how to get the intent of that
sentence into an analysis, though, I do not think it makes
any more of a case for Miller. According to him, the
connection between "Smith deserves to win the mile, " and
"Smith has trained harder than anyone else, " is intelligible
because "we admire the kind of determination and effort
which goes into a course of training ." 114
There are two interesting senses of ’intelligible' that
I think are relevant here. The first is the sense expressed
when someone's behavior has a psychological explanation.
Given what is known about my beliefs, and the fact that I
admire hard work, etc., then it is psychologically
consistent that I also believe that Smith deserves to win.
In this sense it seems clear that a person's belief in hard
work could help make intelligible her belief that Smith
should win the mile.
However, the sense of 'intelligible' that is called for
in the connection between desert claims and their bases is
rather more normative. Desert bases are supposed to justify
their desert claims, not just make them psychologically
understandable. But as I have shown, above, the evocation
of an appraising attitude does not always show that a desert
base justifies its desert claim. Thus I do not think that
Miller is right to base the analysis of desert on attitudes.
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Desert is a Primitive Concept
The alleged analyses of desert by Feinberg, Kleinig,
and Miller all fail. Although desert does seem related to
propriety, evaluation, and attitude, those relationships are
not as simple as their analyses allege. Furthermore, even
if there is a complex relationship between desert and
propriety, or evaluation, or attitude, it is not clear that
any one of them is enough to explicate desert. Thus, I have
no analysis of the concept of desert. I must present it as
a primitive concept that is not further analyzable.
Nevertheless, there are some principles about desert that
make it more than a mere appeal to an obscure intuition.
These principles have to do with the nature of the desert
bases
.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES
In the last chapter, I was unable to provide an
analysis of desert. However, by examining the alleged
desert bases, and presenting my own view about which ones
are legitimate, I can at least shed some light on the nature
of desert. Once the true desert bases have been enumerated,
it will be possible to show that certain kinds of desert
claims are justified, and why, and that certain kinds of
desert claims could never be justified, and why. This will
at least provide some understanding of how desert works,
even if it is not as satisfactory as an in-depth analysis.
Desert and Autonomous Action
In this chapter I consider the view that autonomous
action (freely-willed action) is a legitimate ground for
desert. This view is formulated and defended by George
Sher. llj I will argue that his argument fails to establish
that autonomous action is a legitimate desert base. 116 This
leaves open the question of whether some other argument
might suffice. Before addressing this question, I examine
the formulation itself in some detail. I show that Sher's
view is implausible independently of any argument for or
against it. The view itself is flawed in such a way as to
make it seem unlikely that there is any account of
autonomous action that would make a plausible case for
autonomous action as a desert base. Finally, I argue that
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autonomous action is not a desert base. In part, I base
this on the failure of Sher's account to stand up to any
serious examination; but I also argue that the examples he
used to generate initial plausibility for his view can be
explained by appeal to other, more plausible desert bases.
Sher thinks there is an important connection between
desert and free action. He thinks the link goes beyond the
widely accepted notion that if there were no free acts, then
no one would ever deserve anything
.
117 Sher says that "the
value of a person's acting autonomously is somehow
transmitted to, or inherited by, what he is said to
deserve ." 118 This transfer of value from free action to
desert is what Sher thinks justifies the claim that free
action is a desert base. Since Sher's argument is rather
long and complex, I will first provide a lengthy quotation
of it. I will then try to summarize what I think he is
trying to say, and extract and explain an argument from his
text. Sher starts by noting the value of autonomous action.
Few would deny that persons ought to be able to
choose and act freely, and indeed that their doing
so is of paramount importance ... But if the
opportunity to act freely has value, then so too
must its exercise. We can hardly say that it is a
good thing when someone can determine his own
fate, but not a good thing when he does . 119
The next task for Sher is to show that the value of
autonomous acts is transmitted to particular outcomes.
Before acting, we typically weigh alternative acts
whose consequences extend from the present into
the intermediate and more distant future. Our
deliberations thus encompass both possible initial
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act's and the various later events we expect themto cause.
. .Because we deliberate with an eve toconsequences, our free choices must encompass notjust our immediate doings
, but also the later
^development t0 which we expect them toead. Thus, at least one connection between freeacts and their consequences is internal to thenotion of free agency itself. And, given thisconnection, we can indeed see why any value thatattaches to an autonomous act might carry over tot
pf
t
^?
Ct S consec
Iuences . Because (at least some
of) those
. consequences are part of what an agent
chooses, it would be quite arbitrary to say thatit is good that the agent perform the act he has
chosen, but not good that he enjoy or suffer the
act's predictable consequences. Since choices
encompass both acts and consequences, any valuethat attaches to the implementation of choice mustbelong equally to both... In light of this, one
natural reason for saying that free agents ought
to enjoy or suffer specific consequences is thatthose consequences, where predictable, have
acquired value from the fact that they are part of
what the agent has chosen. And where the
consequences are what the agent intuitively
deserves, our belief that he ought to have what hedeserves will also fall into place . 120
So Sher's reasoning seems to proceed something like
this. Freedom has value, so actually acting freely is
valuable. The concept of freedom is such that when you make
a choice that has foreseeable consequences, then you can
legitimately be said to be choosing those consequences.
Thus, since choosing freely has value, and the consequences
of a free choice are part of that choice, the consequences
also have that value. Because it is good that an agent act
freely, it also good that an agent receive the consequences
of that act. So the agent ought to receive the consequences
of her or his free action. This sense of 'ought' is
captured by our intuitive notion of desert., Therefore,
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because freedom is good, we deserve the consequences of our
freely chosen actions. Here is the argument I extract from
Sher's text.
1 .
2
.
3.
4.
5 .
6 .
Freedom has value.
If freedom has value, then the exercise
ot freedom has value.
If the exercise of freedom has value,
then the expected consequences of the
exercise of freedom have value.
If the expected consequences of the
exercise of freedom have value, then we
ought to receive the expected
consequences of our exercises of
freedom.
If we ought to receive the expected
consequences of our exercises of
freedom, then we deserve to receive the
expected consequences of our exercises
of freedom.
Therefore, we deserve to receive the
expected consequences of our exercises
of freedom.
Premise (1) is alleged to be a basic intuition about
freedom. Premise (2) makes clear the meaning of 'freedom is
valuable.' It really means 'free acts are valuable.'
The rationale for premise (3) is a little more
complicated. Sher claims that free acts cannot be separated
from their expected consequences, because free acts would
not have value if their consequences did not occur.
If someone did not have to live with the
predictable consequences of his choices— ...— then
he would have only a semblance of freedom. His
'autonomy' would be worth little; and if ours is
worth more, it is only because we do inhabit a
world in which choices have consequences. 121
He then appears to make use of something like the
following Principle About Value.
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X
PAV if x has value n, and y is part ofthen y has value n.
In this case, x = autonomous action, y = the
consequences of the autonomous action, and n = the value of
the autonomous action. Thus, the consequences of autonomous
action have the same value as the autonomous action itself.
I think the rationale for premise (4) has to do with
the great value that Sher places on free action. He says
that "free agents ought to enjoy or suffer specific
consequences" because those consequences "where predictable,
have acquired value from the fact that they are part of what
the agent has chosen." 1^ So, if free acts ought to be done,
then their consequences ought to occur. Since free acts are
valuable, they ought to be done. Thus, we ought to receive
the expected consequences of our exercises of freedom.
In premise (5), the sense of 'ought' used here is not
that produces moral obligations. It is weaker than
those, and is in fact captured by our intuitive concept of
desert. Sher says, "Like desert, freedom impinges on our
moral scheme not primarily by creating tightly structured
sets of obligations, but rather as a value whose promotion
always tells for an act or institution." 123
I think this argument is fundamentally misguided, and
that it commits several serious philosophical blunders.
There are serious objections to every premise except premise
( 2 ) .
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First, the objection to premise (1). sher notes that
many people think it is "of paramount importance" that
people be able to choose and act freely, so freedom has
value. 124 This is, unquestionably, true. In fact, it is a
central premise in one of the most popular responses to the
problem of evil for the existence of a benevolent, all-
powerful god. It is obvious to many that a world in which
people freely choose to do good is greatly better than a
world in which people do good only because they are robots
forced to follow deterministic laws. Furthermore, freedom
has many practical consequences, such as allowing us to do
what we want to do, in the ways we see fit. Lack of
freedom, as when one is a slave, is terrible, because one's
dignity is taken away, but also because of all the pain that
the slave-owner can inflict. For these reasons, the value
of freedom is indisputable.
However, the use of the premise as a starting point
shows that Sher makes a fundamental mistake about what kind
of value freedom has. The plan of Sher's argument is to
show that the value of making a free choice can somehow be
transferred to the outcome of that choice. So, it is
clearly required that the making of a free choice have value
independently of its outcome. Otherwise, there would be no
value to be transferred. Thus, I think premise (1) should
be rewritten as follows.
1'. Freedom has intrinsic value.
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While it is clear that (1) is true, it is not clear
that making a choice freely actually has value independently
of the outcome in which it results. It is not clear that
d’) is true
- For instance, we hold freedom to be so
valuable, because it is (allegedly) what allows us to do
what we want. When we do what we want to, we are pleased,
and this is good. Exercises of freedom often lead to
pleasure, so they are instrumentally, or extrinsically good.
Similarly, the lack of freedom often leads to pain, and so
is often instrumentally, or extrinsically, evil. Nor does
the free-will response to the problem of evil show that
freedom, independently of its consequences, is intrinsically
good. The free-will defense compares more complicated
states of affairs than choosing freely to choosing unfreely.
It compares freely choosing good, to unfreely choosing good.
It is unlikely that it is just the mere fact of free choice
that is so important. Instead, it is freedom combined with
what is freely chosen that makes such a great good that many
theists believe freedom to be necessary in the best of all
possible worlds.
Since (1') is needed to make Sher's argument work, and
since all the evidence about freedom is consistent with the
truth of (1), but the falsity of (1'), I think there is no
reason to accept (l f ) . So Sher's argument does not even get
off the ground, because he is working with a muddled concept
of the value of freedom which will not get him what he
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needs. But even if I am wrong, and freedom has intrinsic
value, there are other grave problems with the argument.
I have three objections to premise (3)
.
First of all,
Sher's rationale for this premise undermines his whole chain
of reasoning. He wants to start with the fact that freedom
has value, and then show that it can be transferred to the
free action's consequences. But in his rationale for (3),
he says that freedom would not have value at all if its
consequences did not occur . A standard test for intrinsic
value is to consider whether the object is valuable
considered "in and of itself." If we accept Sher's
rationale for (3), then it appears that freedom does not
have intrinsic value. So Sher's reason for (3) contradicts
(!'), which I argued above is the premise Sher needs to
start with if there is any chance to make his argument work.
However, there is a way to justify (3) which does not
undermine (1') by appealing to a not-implausible
metaphysical view about the nature of actions. On this
view, there is one sense of 'action' that includes all of
its consequences, because they are causally connected to it.
For instance, if I perform the action of crooking my finger,
and it happens to be on a gun's trigger at the time, then
that action includes the pulling of the trigger, the firing
of the gun, the shooting of the bullet, and the death of the
person who is hit by that bullet. There is a very plausible
sense in which all of those consequences are part of my
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crooking my finger. So, when I choose to crook my finger,
it can be said that I also choose those consequences listed
above, since they are causally connected to it. This view,
coupled with PAV, could justify premise (3) without
contradicting (1').
A real problem with (3) is that PAV is false. For one
thing, PAV is a form of the fallacy of division. This is
the fallacy that asserts that if a thing has property x,
then its parts have property x. To see that the properties
of an action are not generally the same as the properties of
its parts, consider an action that takes three hours to
occur. It certainly is not true that every (or indeed any
proper) part of that action takes three hours to occur. So,
unless there is some reason to think that value is unique in
respect to the part-whole relation, it is not legitimate to
appeal to PAV to justify (3)
.
In fact, there are plenty of
examples where the value of an action as a whole is not the
same as the value of its parts. For example, a doctor saves
a person's life by removing his appendix just before it
bursts. Many parts of that operation have negative value,
because of the pain they produce. One such part was the
shot that delivered the anesthetic. That shot was painful,
and so any extrinsic positive value that shot had (it led to
less pain during the operation) was at least somewhat offset
by its disvalue (it was immediately painful). Clearly the
part of the operation consisting of the administration of a
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painful shot and nothing else does not have the same value
as the operation as a whole. Indeed, the shot was, by
itself, useless--it did not do anything to prevent the
appendix from bursting, nor did it help remove the appendix.
Thus, it is highly implausible that all the parts of an
extended action have the same value as that action does as a
whole. The Principle About Value is false, and so there
does not appear to be any reason to accept premise (3)
The third problem is this. If we grant that a free
action includes its consequences, then there is no reason to
claim that it is only the expected consequences of the
action that have value. Sometimes the expected consequences
of an action do not occur, so they do not get any value from
the free choice. Instead, the actual consequences "inherit"
that value, if anything does. So it seems to me that Sher's
consideration of only those consequences that are expected
is not justified by the reasoning for (3)
.
If that
justification works at all, it works for the actual
consequences of free actions, not the expected (except where
the two are the same, of course)
.
Here is my objection to premise (4)
.
Consider a person
who freely donates a large amount of money to a charity.
The expected consequence is the construction of new
facilities, which allow the charity to do its business
better, thus benefitting many more people. On Sher’s
account, then, the donor ought to receive all of the value
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of the expected consequences of the donation. But this
seems wrong. Just because this consequence is the expected
outcome of the donor's free act, it certainly does not
follow that the donor ought to receive all of this positive
value. Indeed, the reason the donor gave in the first place
was to help others. So, it seems ridiculous to think that
we always ought to receive the value of the expected
consequences of our free actions.
Finally, in premise (5), Sher claims that because we
ought to receive the consequences of our free actions,
therefore we deserve to receive them. As Sher himself
notes, there are many different senses of 'ought,' and many
desert-claims do not correlate with moral obligations. 125
Thus, we cannot just infer that because a person ought to
receive something, that therefore she deserves to receive
that thing. In the case of receiving the consequences of
our free choices then, it is incumbent upon Sher to show why
in this case the senses of the two concepts correlate. He
does not show this; instead he seems to appeal to our
intuition that they are the same. But consider a person who
is very skeptical about desert, perhaps a philosopher like
Rawls. He might agree that we ought to receive the
consequences of our free actions, but deny that we deserve
them. So, it appears that Sher's argument has not really
advanced the issue in such a way as to convince those who
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think that freedom is not a desert base, that it really is
one
.
The Expected-Consequences Account
I have already criticized Sher's argument for free
action as a desert base. This was a criticism of his
argument, not its conclusion. I do not think the premises
justify the conclusion. However, such criticism does not
show that the conclusion must be false. In fact, I think
there is some plausibility to the notion of free action as
one of several desert bases. In this section, I will focus
my criticism on the actual proposal. I will show that
Sher's formulation does not work.
Sher never explicitly formulates what he calls "the
expected-consequences account." 126 However, from the remarks
he has made above, and his discussion of the various kinds
of alleged instances of desert grounded in free action, I
think that EC1 is a natural first attempt at formulating his
account
.
EC1 S deserves X for action A if S freely
chooses A, and X is a predictable
consequence of A.
According to Sher, this account is consistent with the
fact that deserts do not confer obligations. It also works
with many specific cases. For instance, Wilson deserved to
be disqualified; he knew the deadline for applications was
March 1. Further, Harris, who did not bring his raincoat,
now deserves to get wet; Simmons, who did not study for his
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exam, now deserves to fail. 127 Additionally, EC1 works for
positive deserts. Just as the non-bringer of the umbrella
deserves to get wet when the forecast is for rain, so does
the bringer of the umbrella deserve to stay dry.
More important, we believe that persons who
resourcefully seize opportunities deserve the
resulting benefits, that persons who carefully
make and execute plans deserve success... 128
EC1 accommodates all of these beliefs.
To deal with the problem of uncertainty in prediction,
Sher takes the expected-consequences model of choice from
decision theory and uses it to determine what is deserved.
Suppose the probability of rain is fifty percent, and I am
considering whether to bring my umbrella with me. In such a
case what is chosen "is neither to get wet nor to stay dry,
but rather the combination of a certain risk of getting wet
and a certain chance of staying dry." 129 I think this can be
understood as follows: if I choose to leave my umbrella
home, then what I deserve is .5 * (disvalue from being
rained on with no umbrella) + .5 * (value of not carrying
around an umbrella when there is no rain)
.
EC1 only constitutes a partial analysis of desert. So
saying it does not account for all cases is trivial and
easy, and shows nothing wrong. For instance, a criminal
deserves to be punished though it is predictable that he
will get away, or a worker deserves wages that she
predictably will not get; these cases show that there are
other principles of desert at work. 130 Thus, ECl is supposed
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to be an account of sufficient but not necessary conditions
for desert.
Problems occur when we can show that someone gets what
is predicted, yet does not deserve it. For instance, the
burglar who predictably gets away with the robbery does not
deserve the spoils. There are five types of case where
expected consequences seem undeserved. When the
consequences are:
1. Very easily acquired.
2. The disastrous results of merely
careless acts.
3. The spoils of wrongful acts.
4. The harmful effects of self-sacrificing
acts
.
5. The results of choices made under
threat, or in some other illegitimately
structured choice situation. 131
Consider alleged problems of type (5)
.
If I surrender
my money at gunpoint, it may be rather predictable that I
will not get it back. Nevertheless, I do not deserve to so
lose it! Such apparent objections are easy to solve, for
such an act is not truly free. It was made under duress.
Only the predictable consequences of freely-chosen acts are
deserved. 132
While alleged problems of type (5) do not seem to be
too troublesome, problems of type (1) are a little more
difficult. Examples of type 1 include the person who signs
papers to inherit a fortune, the person who chooses to keep
a wallet full of money that was just found lying on the
86
street, and the entertainer who performs one concert that
earns millions. 133
Sher says it is easy to show that these are not actual
desert cases. "What initially has value, and thus what
confers that value upon expected consequences, is an agent's
genuine exercise of autonomy." Sher claims that these are
not cases of "genuine exercises of autonomy." Exercises of
autonomy
are surely more than unimpeded acts that will
obviously yield large benefits at little cost.
Where no more is involved—where the agent neither
has to choose among real alternatives nor has to
exercise thought or ingenuity nor has to do
anything dif ficult--his choice is too easy, too
automatic, to be significant. Though not unfree,
it is also not a meaningful expression of his
will. 134
Just what Sher might mean by claiming that an agent's
genuine exercise of autonomy must be a "meaningful
expression of his will" is not entirely clear. It seems to
have something to do with the way in which the agent made
the choice. In a "meaningful expression of his will," it
seems an agent must have had to exercise thought or
ingenuity, or take a risk, or do something difficult, and
his doing one of these things seems to be a sign that the
choice really expressed who he was, or something like that.
Whatever the agent's meaningful expression is though,
thought, ingenuity, risk-taking, etc., are suitable criteria
for it. This suggests a principle about free acts, and a
modification to EC1
.
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GEA S's choice. A, is a genuine exercise of
autonomy =df. S had to exercise thought
or ingenuity, or had to take a risk, or
do something difficult, to choose A.
EC2 S deserves X for choice A if i) A is a
genuine exercise of autonomy, ii) s
freely chooses A, and X is a predictable
consequence of A.
EC2 appears to handle problems of type (1)
.
Problems
of type (2) include the person who gets terminal lung cancer
from smoking, and the ice fisherman who does not just lose a
truck, but actually dies from driving on the ice in late
spring. In such cases, the consequence is fairly strongly
predictable, but the disvalue is far higher than what is
intuitively deserved. Sher's response is that this shows
that the intrinsic disvalue of certain consequences is far
higher than the positive intrinsic value of genuine
exercises of autonomy.
To say that personal autonomy is a great good is
not to deny that suffering and death are great
evils. Thus, when a free act's consequences
include such misfortunes, there comes a point at
which the value they inherit from the agent's
exercise of freedom is outweighed by their
intrinsic disvalue. 135
This seems to suggest a sort of "cap" on the amount of
disvalue from a free act's consequence that a person can
deserve; it cannot be more than the original value of the
autonomous act (or choice)
.
EC3 S deserves X for choice A if i) A is a
genuine exercise of autonomy, ii) S
freely chooses A, and X is a predictable
consequence of A, iii) the intrinsic
disvalue of X is not greater than the
intrinsic value of A.
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EC3 thus handles problems of type (1) and (2)
.
There
are plenty of examples that fit into problems of type (3)
The mobster who predictably gets away with murder, the
corporate executive who predictably gets away with
embezzling a fortune, etc. Sher imagines that Adams has
predictably made a fortune through the exploitation of the
poor and uneducated. Here is the passage where he explains
why Adams does not deserve his riches.
The positive value of the agent's exercise of
freedom is plausibly said to be offset by the
negative value of the way he has exercised that
freedom. Although it is good that Adams has acted
freely, it is bad that he has freely chosen to do
what is wrong. And because this is bad—because
it would have been far better if Adams had not
made this choice--it would also have been better
if the consequences of the choice had not played
themselves out. 136
Sher seems to reason as follows. Although it is good
to act autonomously, it is bad to choose to do wrong.
Because Adams's choice is not the best, it would be better
if the consequences had not occurred. Part of the
consequences are that Adams gets rich. So it would be
better if he had not got rich. Before discussing Sher's
solution, it will be worthwhile to discuss the fourth type
of problem.
Finally, problems of type (4) . Johnson has predictably
suffered a broken leg while saving a child from being run
over by a truck. Johnson does not deserve his broken leg
because
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Although it is good that Johnson has chosen
freely, and good also that his choice was a
virtuous one, it is bad that the price of virtue
is harm or injury to a good man. It would havebeen far better if Johnson had not had to choosebetween injury and saving the child; and so it
would have been better also if the conseguences ofhis choice had not played themselves out. 137
Sher remarks, about cases of benefits received because
of wrong acts, and harms suffered as a result of virtuous
acts, that
even if neither agent has suffered a misfortune
whose disvalue is great enough to outweigh the
value of his free choice, both actions have other
aspects whose disvalue seems to do just this. 138
This suggests that a slight modification of clause (iii) of
EC3 will cover these cases. Using the terminology I
suggested above, it seems that clause (iii) should be
restated as follows:
iii') The overall value of A is not
negative
.
This way of putting the matter is more general than the
original. It includes cases where the intrinsic disvalue of
X is greater than the intrinsic value of A, but it also
includes cases where there is some other aspect of A which
makes its negative results outweigh its positive ones.
Thus, it is designed to take care of problems of types three
and four.
So EC3, along with GEA seems to be Sher's final account
of free choice as a desert base. Of course, it is
insufficient to cover all cases of desert, but other than
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that, Sher appears to think there are no problems with it.
Here are the two principles, updated and side by side.
GEA S's choice, A, is a genuine exercise of
autonomy =df
. S had to exercise thought
or ingenuity, or had to take a risk, or
do something difficult, to choose A.
EC3 S deserves X for choice A if and only if
i) A is a genuine exercise of autonomy,
ii) S freely chooses A, and X is a
predictable consequence of A, iii') the
overall value of A is not negative.
My problems with the account are these: A) GEA is too
restrictive. B) EC3's third clause does not solve the
problems raised by problem types (2-4)
.
(The disastrous
results of carelessness, the spoils of evil, and the harm
from self-sacrifice.)
(A) For instance, suppose I miss a deadline. I deserve
to be disqualified because I knew when the deadline was, and
I did not get my task done by that time. According to GEA,
this does not count as a genuine exercise of autonomy
because (leaving aside the question of whether it was a
meaningful expression of my will) I did not have to use
thought or ingenuity, nor take a risk, nor do anything
difficult, to miss the deadline. It was quite easy to let
it pass by. Yet it does seem to me that my failing to meet
the deadline could have been a genuine free choice made by
me. It was free in the important way that acts are
sometimes said to be free, in that I could have seen to it
that I got the task done on time. No disaster prevented me
from doing the task, I just did not do it. Further, it
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arise from myseems that I do deserve the bad results that
freely missing the deadline. So this is a genuine case that
GEA rules out.
In general, it seems that many genuine cases of
deserving bad things would be ruled out by GEA. Note that
this is an important class of desert, because Sher does
think that people can deserve bad things for their foolish
free actions. One of his examples that he claims his
account handles just fine has to do with a person who
chooses to drive his truck on a frozen pond after there has
been a lot of warm weather. That person, thinks Sher,
deserves the expected bad result, that his truck will break
through the ice. Thus, this defect of GEA needs to be
addressed before EC3 can work.
(B) Even if there is some satisfactory version of GEA,
clause three of EC3 is unsuited to its task. The usual
convention is that the intrinsic value of an act is the
value of the act itself, the extrinsic value is the value of
its consequences, and that the sum of the extrinsic value
plus the intrinsic value is the overall value. Sher holds
that acting freely has a certain amount of intrinsic value,
and that this intrinsic value somehow gets transferred to
the outcome of the free choice. In addition, Sher
recognizes that an outcome has a certain value irrespective
of what it might have inherited from the free choice that
caused it to occur. So Sher seems to claim that when the
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sum of a free act's intrinsic value plus extrinsic value is
negative, then the person does not deserve that outcome for
that act.
For this account to make any sense at all, it must be
assumed that various free choices have differing amounts of
intrinsic value. For assume that all free choices have the
same intrinsic value. Then certain intuitively correct
desert judgments will be shown incorrect. For instance,
imagine that the intrinsic value of any free choice is only
moderate, around ten units of value. This low value will do
fine for showing that people do not deserve the disastrous
results of merely careless (though genuinely free) acts.
Sher mentions that a daredevil does not deserve paralysis
for trying to leap a twenty-foot chasm, that a heavy smoker
does not deserve lung-cancer, and that a fisherman who
drives on ice without testing it does not deserve to lose
his life (just his truck). On Sher's account, with the
intrinsic value of free choice set at ten, all of these
examples work. Certainly the results from being paralyzed,
from having cancer, and from dying, are negatively far
greater than ten units of value. However, there are
certainly some decisions we make whose results are
moderately disastrous, that we do deserve. The fisherman's
losing his truck is a case in point. Sher agrees that the
fisherman who drives on the ice deserves to lose his truck,
though not his life. But even the loss of a truck has got
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to be negatively greater than ten units of value. Only a
very rich fisherman would not mind spending ten to twenty-
thousand dollars in such a case.
Raising the intrinsic value of free choices enough so
that cases such as the fisherman's truck work out does not
work either. Then the value will be so high that there will
be cases of where the desert will be too harsh a punishment.
So it must be that the intrinsic value of free choice
is not fixed, but varies from case to case. Sher does seem
to have this in mind in his discussion of cases of genuine
autonomy. Recall that a truly free choice is supposed to
involve some risk, or thought, or ingenuity, or difficulty.
It makes a kind of sense to think that the more risk,
thought, ingenuity or difficulty involved, the more valuable
the free choice. But it hardly seems that there would be
enough difference between the values of various free choices
that could be made to account for the wide range of values
of deserts.
In any case, consider the person who makes a difficult
free choice, that required much ingenuity: to rob a bank
and get away with it. Why should we think this decision has
any merit? What is so good about freely choosing to rob a
bank? It seems to me that in this case, freedom is a
necessary condition for ascribing desert, but that it
certainly is not sufficient for concluding that the expected
consequence of succeeding is deserved.
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There is another, deeper problem with clause (iii’).
It does not really work for cases (3) and (4)
.
First of
all, in introducing these cases, Sher admits that in neither
case is it true that the outcome is sufficiently tragic to
outweigh the value of the agent's exercise of freedom. 139 It
is not that the actual value is negative, since the "other
aspects" of the cases whose disvalue is great are only
counterfactual considerations. For instance, in the case of
the unscrupulous Adams, it would have been better if he had
made a different choice than he actually did
,
and in the
case of the heroic Johnson, it would have been better if he
had had a different choice than he actually did. A little
reflection will make it abundantly clear that introducing
counterfactual considerations into this account of desert
will do more harm than good. According to Sher, the Johnson
case is not one that is ruled out by clause (iii'), because
the actual value of X plus A is positive. However, there is
a state of affairs (not physically possible for Johnson to
achieve, but still possible in some sense) that would have
been better. That is the state of affairs where Johnson was
not forced to choose between death of the infant and a
broken leg. One such state of affairs is much better than
what actually happened. Therefore, since it would have been
much better if that (call it 'ideal') state of affairs had
happened, Johnson does not deserve the broken leg. This
case clearly shows that Sher is appealing to counterfactual
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situations to keep his account. We need some further clause
besides clause (iii 1 ).
iv) If s had performed some other choice
than A, the outcome would not have been
better than it actually was.
Even this is not quite strong enough, because in the
Johnson case, there was no other choice for him to make.
What Sher compares the situation to is one where Johnson did
not have to make such a terrible choice. I am not sure
exactly how to incorporate that consideration into the
expected consequences account, but that hardly matters, for
this attempt to make it work is obviously flawed. Consider
a different kind of case. I can choose to donate my estate
to the charity of your choice. Unfortunately, though my
estate is not pitiable, it is nowhere near the size of Bill
Gates's. So even though I do donate my estate, and it has
some predictably good consequences, it would have been far
better if I had not had to choose between donating my
estate, or donating less. It would have been far better if
I could have donated an estate the size of Bill Gates's to
that charity.
Because those consequences would have been so much
better it follows, on my latest reconstruction of Sher's
account, that I do not deserve whatever honors or accolades
I get from the donation of my mediocre estate. This is
crazy. Clearly, the fact that if I had had more money to
donate, that would have been much better, can have no
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bearing on whether I deserve anything for what I was able to
and actually did do. It should be quite clear that any
account that follows the reasoning Sher uses in the Johnson
case will rule out every instance of desert. There will
always be a state of affairs that is such that it would have
been much better if that state of affairs had happened
instead of what actually did happen. But this does not
properly affect the desert at issue.
Finally, an objection to clause (ii)
,
that the outcome
must be predictable. This simply is not true. For
instance, take Adams and his exploitation of the poor and
uneducated. It is predictable that this will make him rich.
But, suppose that something unpredictable happens — the
exploited masses revolt and Adams loses his fortune. It
seems quite obvious that the revolution, though
unpredictable, is just what Adams deserves for his
exploitation. However, according to Sher's account, this is
not a deserved outcome for Adams' free choice to exploit the
workers, because it is not predictable.
Autonomous Action is Not a Desert Base
The misguided reasoning displayed in the argument for
free choice as a desert base, and the failure of the
expected-consequences account itself, lead me to believe
that free choice is not, after all, a desert base. A re-
consideration of the putative examples of free choice as a
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desert base shows that each of them can be explained as some
other kind of desert. Here are the examples.
1) Wilson, who knowingly submitted his
application late, deserves to be
disqualified.
2) Harris, who did not bring his raincoat,
now deserves to get wet, while Georgina,
who did bring her umbrella, deserves to
stay dry.
3) Simmons, who did not study for his exam,
now deserves to fail.
4) Given the warm weather lately, anyone
who is crazy enough to drive their
vehicle on the ice deserves to have it
fall through.
5) Persons who resourcefully seize
opportunities deserve the resulting
benefits
.
6) Persons who carefully make and execute
plans deserve success.
7) Persons who forego immediate benefits in
expectation of longer-range gains
deserve those gains.
It seems to me that anyone who accepts any of (1-7)
above as legitimate desert claims can do so without appeal
to Sher's expected consequences account of desert. For
instance, although (1) is really too vague to be sure about,
it could be a case of desert due to laziness. Examples (6)
and (7) seem to me to examples of desert due to diligence or
hard work or effort. Example (5) could either be a desert
due to the possession of certain character traits such as
boldness and resourcefulness, or again desert due to
diligence, it is hard to tell because it is stated so
vaguely. Finally, claims (2-4) seem to me to be based on a
presumed standard of rationality. That is, the appeal of
these claims comes from the sense that it seems somehow
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f-*-ttincj that people who behave irrationally should, suffer,
while those who behave rationally should benefit. It is
very similar to deserts due to moral behavior. Those who
transgress the moral code deserve punishment, while those
who stick with the code deserve reward. Here, the standard
is not morality, but rationality. Thus, the person "crazy
enough" to disregard rational warnings about the danger of
thin ice deserves to suffer, while the person who brings an
umbrella when she has reason to believe it will rain
deserves to stay dry. Similarly for the test-taker, though
I think this case needs to be spelled out more fully. For
instance, a person who does not study for a test because he
is justified in his surety that he will "ace" it, does not
deserve to fail. But if we assume the test-taker not only
has not studied, but also needed to study, and knew he
needed to study, then it seems irrational for him to expect
to pass it without studying.
This aspect of desert due to rationality is enforced by
clause (ii) of Sher’s expected consequence account, where it
is required that only the expected consequences of free
behavior can be deserved. After all, it is rational
decision-making that produces accounts of expected outcomes
and tries to act on them. We can act perfectly freely even
in being willful and irrational, and since usually the
positive outcomes of such behavior are quite unexpected,
Sher's account rules them out.
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In addition to this covert appeal to rationality,
Sher's expected-consequences account also appeals to
diligence. The second clause of GEA requires that genuine
acts of free will are either, risky, difficult, or in need
of ingenuity. Most choices that are risky, difficult, or
need ingenuity, are choices that will require much hard
work, or diligence, for their outcomes to be successful.
However, there can be all sorts of free choices that do not
require such hard work. Thus, I think that GEA makes desert
due to diligence seem like desert due to free choice.
Once it is realized that all the putative claims of
desert due to free choice can be explained as desert due to
some other desert base, and once it is seen how the expected
consequence account makes covert appeals to rationality and
diligence, then I think there is no reason to accept it.
For one thing, we can account for desert without it, and for
another, any plausibility in the formal expected-
consequences account can be shown to be due to its
incorporation of other desert bases.
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CHAPTER 5
DILIGENCE AND VIRTUE
In this chapter I will examine the relationship between
effort (diligence) and desert, and then since diligence is a
kind of virtue, the relationship between virtue and desert.
Why the Diligent Deserve the Goods
Of all the desert bases, diligence is perhaps the most
compelling. Some have even maintained that diligence is the
only legitimate desert base. 140 In his book, Desert, George
Sher tries to provide an answer to the question of why the
diligent deserve what they deserve. He thinks that desert
bases themselves need justification. So he provides a
justification for diligence as a desert base. My first task
in this chapter, then, will be to evaluate Sher's claims
about the justification of diligence. 141
According to Sher, the solution to the puzzle about why
people deserve what they diligently strive for is suggested
by an examination of what it is that they deserve through
their diligence. What is deserved through diligence is
whatever goal that diligence is aimed at. Sher writes,
"what any hard worker deserves is just the outcome he has
striven to produce." 142 The question of why the hard worker
should get what she is striving for can be answered. First,
like other desert-claims, desert for diligence does not
imply that anyone has any moral obligations to see to it
that a diligent worker get what she deserves.
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In itself, diligent effort creates no
entitlements. It does however, seem to confer
upon one's goal a value it would otherwise
lack ... As clarified, the thesis whose rationale we
want to understand is that diligent efforts confer
value upon their intentional objects . 143
The thesis that diligent efforts confer value upon
their intentional objects is quite similar to the thesis
that desire confers value upon the object of desire. This
thesis has its most famous exposition in the work of Ralph
Barton Perry, Realms of Value. There Perry holds that any
object has value (positive or negative) so long as someone
takes interest (positive or negative) in it . 144 For Sher,
this parallel suggests an explanation of the idea that the
diligent are deserving. Sher thinks that diligence is
closely related to desire, so that if it is true that desire
confers value upon a goal, then diligent effort to achieve
that goal could be said to magnify that value.
Because even idle desires are thought to confer
some value on their objects, and because diligent
striving is in some sense an extension of desire,
we may conjecture that the far greater value of
the objects of diligent striving is somehow a
function of the way diligent striving surpasses
mere desire . 145
Although Sher depends on the thesis that desires confer
value, he does not assume that only desire confers value,
and he also tries to justify that thesis. His explanation
of the idea that desires confer value provides the first
premise of his argument to show that the diligent deserve to
achieve the goals toward which their efforts are directed.
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Sher's argument starts with a premise that he thinks is
a precondition for morality itself, " that persons are
intrinsically valuable . 146 Since persons care "intensely and
complexly" about themselves and other things, Sher thinks it
is plausible to believe that if persons have intrinsic
value, then what matters to them also has intrinsic value.
He writes.
Not only are the beings to which morality ascribes
fundamental value capable of taking other things
to have value, but their taking those other things
to have value is central to what makes them
valuable. Thus, it does seem natural to hold that
a portion of their value devolves upon what they
value--that some of the absolute value of persons
is transferred to, or inherited by, the things
they care about . 147
Thus, Sher has argued that if persons have intrinsic
value, then the things they take interest in have intrinsic
value. That is, he takes it that he is proving something
similar to Perry's claim about the conference of value by
interest, but his reason why is that people are, themselves,
intrinsically valuable. This view is different from
Perry's, because on Perry's view, if no one takes interest
in you, then you have no value; but on Sher's view, you and
I have value independently of any interests. On the other
hand, if I do take interest in you, then your value
(presumably) is enhanced.
Sher's next task is to show that diligence confers a
lot more value than mere desire confers. After all, he
notes, we do distinguish between those who desire strongly,
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but do not work, from those who desire equally strongly and
do work. We think it far better for the latter to get what
they want than the former to get what they want. 148
According to Sher, there are two reasons that diligence
confers far more value than desire, and he thinks that these
reasons show that diligence acts like a species of desire,
in that it magnifies the value that is conferred by desire.
His two reasons for why diligence confers much more value
than mere desire are (1) "sustained effort stems from will
and judgment as desire typically does not," and (2)
"sustained effort forecloses other options as mere desires
do not." 149
An understanding of Sher's conception of a person is
needed to understand the importance of these reasons.
According to Sher,
Since our lives are constituted by our actions,
our time and energy are thus the very stuff of
which we fashion our lives. Hence, any agent who
devotes a major portion of his time and energy to
achieving a goal is quite literally making that
goal a part of himself. 150
So it appears that one reason that the diligent ought
to get what they deserve is that their diligent efforts to
achieve a goal have made that goal a part of them.
Presumably, Sher's reasoning is something like this. If the
achievement of a goal is a part of a person, and the person
is intrinsically valuable, then it would be a bad thing if
that person were not to achieve that goal. It would be as
if the person had lost a part of herself. So the person
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ought to get the goal she diligently strives for, so she
deserves it. Here, then, is my first interpretation of
Sher's Argument for Diligence.
(1) People are intrinsically valuable.
(2) If people are intrinsically valuable,
then the things people desire are
intrinsically valuable.
(3) If the things people desire are
intrinsically valuable, then the goals
toward which people diligently strive
are highly intrinsically valuable.
(4) If the goals toward which people
diligently strive are highly
intrinsically valuable, then people
deserve to get the goals toward which
they diligently strive.
(5) Therefore, people deserve to get the
goals toward which they diligently
strive
.
I believe that this argument is suggested by the text.
Premise (1) is the "precondition for morality." Premise (2)
displays Sher's belief that the intrinsic value of a person
can be "transferred" to the objects that person desires.
Premise (3) captures Sher's view that diligent effort
magnifies the value transferred by desire. Premise (4) is
based on the notion that someone who is diligently striving
to achieve a goal is "quite literally making that goal a
part of himself," and so deserves to get that goal.
However, premise (2) is highly implausible. Sher
writes, "some of the absolute value of persons is
transferred to, or inherited by, the things they care
about." 151 (By "absolute" value, I can only think Sher has
in mind intrinsic value.) Taking Sher's concept of
transference seriously leads to bizarre results. If I have
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some money, and I transfer it to your account, then I will
have less money than before. If you inherit money from me,
then that money is no longer mine. According to Sher, then,
whenever I take interest in something, some of my intrinsic
value goes out of me and into the thing I care about. If I
cared about a lot of things, I could run out of intrinsic
value, just like I could run out of money. But this makes
no sense at all. Surely my intrinsic value cannot be
decreased by my taking interest in something.
So the value of what is cared for is not transferred
from person to object by desire, but must be created by
desire. But then it is unclear why anyone would think that
this is "absolute," or intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is
the value something has regardless of its usefulness to
people, regardless of the interest people take in it.
Intrinsic value is value-in-itself
. The value a thing has
because of the interest people take in it is extrinsic
value, and so not "absolute" value. It is value-for-a-
person. Thus, this argument fails in premise (2) . The
intrinsic value of a person cannot be transferred to the
objects she cares about.
However, although Sher's reasoning does seem to make
this mistake, I think there is a similar argument that
maintains Sher’s key points without making any highly
implausible claims about transfers of intrinsic value. This
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Second Argument for Diligence is suggested by Perry’s view
about what states of affairs have intrinsic value. 152
(1) The state of affairs that a person
desires an object is intrinsically
valuable
.
(2) If the state of affairs that a person
desires an object is intrinsically
valuable, then the state of affairs that
a person diligently strives for goal gis intrinsically valuable.
(3) If the state of affairs that a person
diligently strives for goal g is
intrinsically valuable, then people
deserve to get the goals toward which
they diligently strive.
(4) Therefore, people deserve to get the
goals toward which they diligently
strive
.
However, both of the arguments suggested so far suffer
from a grave defect. They depend upon Perry’s view that
desire confers value. Few would accept this view, because
it makes it too easy to come by value. For instance, if a
sadist is positively interested in torturing babies, then
torturing babies has value. This seems just plainly false.
Thus, Perry's view is, at the least, highly controversial.
It is not the kind of premise on which one wants to rest
such an important argument.
Another weak link in the two arguments presented is the
contention that we deserve to get what we strive for because
our striving increases the value of that thing. One may
wonder why the fact that diligent striving increases the
value of an object is any reason to think that, therefore,
the person deserves to receive that value. We do not in
general assume that just because some object has value for
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someone, that the person deserves to get it. Otherwise, for
instance, I deserve to have rather more material wealth than
I do now. Similarly, if a statue has value, that does not
mean I deserve to have that statue. Suppose that statue's
value is increased. It certainly does not follow that I am
more deserving of it than when it was less valuable. Thus,
it appears to me that this whole project of showing that the
objects of diligent striving acquire more value the harder
we work for them is rather pointless. What we need to show
is that the harder we work for our goals, the more we
deserve to have them. But that is not accomplished by
showing merely that the object itself acquires value.
There is another possible way to interpret the
argument, and it does not require the controversial "Perry
Premise," that desires confer value. Furthermore, this
Third Argument for Diligence does not assume that as an
object increases in value, so does a person's desert for
that object.
(1) People are intrinsically valuable and
constituted by their actions.
(2) If people are intrinsically valuable and
constituted by their actions, then
people deserve to get the goals toward
which they diligently strive.
(3) Therefore, people deserve to get the
goals toward which they diligently
strive
.
Since this argument does not make use of the "Perry
Premise, " it avoids the issue of whether intrinsic value can
be inherited by the objects of interest. Instead, this
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argument takes seriously the notion that "you are what you
diligently try to do." Consistent with a line of thought
that Sher has expressed before, we may reason as follows. 153
Given that it is true that you are intrinsically valuable,
then what you diligently try to do is intrinsically valuable
too, since it is also part of you. At any rate, this
appears to be the upshot of Sher's discussion of the
importance of diligence to what constitutes a person. He
writes,
They [the diligent] ought to succeed because their
sustained efforts are substantial investments of
themselves--the ultimate sources of value— in the
outcomes they seek. 154
Here are the rationales for the premises. Premise (1)
follows from the Kantian conception that people are ends in
themselves ("a prerequisite for morality is that people
matter"), plus Sher's notion that a person is largely the
sum of her or his actions. The rest of the work of this
argument is done in premise (2). Sher's concept of
personhood is important as well, but I will put that aside
until last. Premise (2) makes use of Sher's notion that
when people diligently strive toward a goal, they invest a
substantial portion of their limited, and valuable
resources. They ought to be compensated for such
expenditures. The best compensation is, of course, to
achieve that goal. This interpretation of the argument
rests heavily on the words quoted above, about sustained
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efforts being substantial investments of the persons
themselves
.
155
Perhaps Sher thinks that this premise is strengthened
by the belief that the things people strive for are
increased in value by the very fact of their striving for
them. If so, then premise (2) would make a covert appeal to
the "Perry Premise." Nevertheless, given the controversial
nature of the view that interest confers value, I think Sher
should not make use of this kind of appeal. Thus, the
"Perry Premise" appeal aside, it seems to me that Sher's
reasoning for (2) depends upon his notion of how a person
makes a goal a part of herself.
One problem with Sher's justification is this. He
claims that a diligent worker is "quite literally making
that goal a part of himself." 156 But it is clearly possible
to work hard towards a goal, and yet not achieve that goal.
It is even possible to work supremely hard and yet not
succeed. Thus, it is not always true that as a person works
hard, she makes the goal a part of herself. For if she does
not achieve the goal, then it cannot be a part of herself.
In such a case, it could be said that the person is trying
to make the goal a part of herself, but is failing.
So it seems that when it comes to the justification of
the view that a person should achieve the goal she
diligently strives for, that one cannot appeal to the fact
that the goal is part of the person. Otherwise it would
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turn out that this justification only works for people who
actually achieve their goals. Someone who works hard but
does not achieve her goal could not be said to deserve it,
because she has not made it part of herself. But clearly,
in many cases we would say that even though the person did
not achieve the goal, and so has not made it part of her,
she nevertheless deserved to achieve that goal.
Perhaps the claim could be modified. Sher could claim
that when a person is diligently striving for a goal, it is
not that he is actually making that goal a part of himself,
but that he is attempting to, that makes him deserve the
goal. But people do not generally deserve a thing just
because they are attempting to achieve it. Thus, it is not
the attempt that makes a person deserving, but the quality
of the attempt. A diligent attempt is clearly more
deserving than a half-hearted attempt. But now the attempt
to justify desert for diligence is circular. It starts with
the assumption that when a person diligently strives toward
a goal, the person is trying to make that goal a part of
himself. The next claim is that it would be a good thing
for the person to succeed. The reason why is that it is a
diligent attempt. But this is just what was to be proved:
that the diligent are deserving. Thus, it does not seem
possible to make a non-circular argument without appealing
to the "Perry Premise, " and yet this premise is too
controversial. Any argument that appeals to the "Perry
111
Premise to conclude that the diligent are deserving has the
following characteristic. Its conclusion is more plausible
than its premise. This is a defect.
Finally, Sher seems to be fundamentally confused when
he concludes that because our lives are constituted by our
actions, that therefore we are constituted by our actions.
He seems to be confusing a person with a person's life.
Clearly though, a person is not the same as her life. A
person is constituted by her body and (some would say) her
soul. But a person's life is filled with all sorts of
events. Thus, when a person tries to make a goal a part of
her life, she is not "quite literally" trying to make that
goal a part of herself. It is not as if the goal will
become another one of her body parts. 157 Sher's concept of a
person is simply confused, and premise (1) is false.
So it seems to me that all three interpretations of the
diligence argument fail. Perhaps I have not understood
Sher's reasoning, but so far as I can tell, it is mistaken.
In any case, since diligence is a species of virtue, I will
next consider Sher's more general argument for the
legitimacy of desert claims based on virtue.
Why the Virtuous Deserve the Goods
When George Sher takes up this subject, he appears to
think that the question to ask is, "Can we show that it is a
good thing for the virtuous to be rewarded?" He notes that
W. D. Ross claimed that there was value in "the
112
proportionment of happiness to virtue, " 158 but says, that
"Ross, typically, offers no defense of this claim. Can we
do better?" 159 Sher writes,
• •
•
[M]
y
argument rests on two premises. It
assumes that (1) persons derive (some of) their
worth from the fact that they seek value, and that
(2) the intentional objects of persons' desires
and efforts derive value from the fact that they
are sought by beings with worth. 160
Sher claims that seeking value is "part of what confers
worth on person, " so "we can conclude that the happiness of
the specially virtuous has special value." 161 In addition,
Sher claims that "the moral virtues that interest us are all
heightened and concentrated propensities to seek forms of
value. " 16 ^ For instance, the generous person seeks to bring
about good results. So each case of a person exhibiting a
moral virtue is a case where, "the person exemplifies, to a
higher degree than others, the value-seeking propensity that
is crucial to the worth of persons." 163 Therefore, "we may
reasonably suppose that he acquires greater worth than do
others from his possession of it." 164 Sher finishes the
argument with the following reasoning:
But if a virtuous person does have greater worth
than others, then his desires and sustained
efforts will be able to confer correspondingly
more value on their objects. Thus, however good
it is that an ordinary person's desires are
satisfied, or that his diligent efforts succeed,
it will be even better if the person who is
satisfied or successful is especially virtuous.
When this is the case, his happiness will have
special value. 165
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At this point, Sher starts considering objections to
his argument. He appears, therefore, to think that he has
shown that the virtuous are deserving. Here is my
interpretation of the argument suggested by the above text:
1) Seeking value confers worth on persons.
2) If seeking value confers worth on
persons, then the virtuous are worth
more than the non-virtuous
.
3) If the virtuous are worth more than the
non-virtuous, then the happiness of the
virtuous is more valuable than the
happiness of the non-virtuous.
4) If the happiness of the virtuous is more
valuable than the happiness of the non-
virtuous, then it ought to be the case
that the virtuous are happy.
5) If it ought to be the case that the
virtuous are happy, then the virtuous
deserve happiness.
6) Therefore, the virtuous deserve
happiness
.
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Here are Sher's rationales. He gives three reasons for
premise (1)
:
A) When people seek value, they seek that
which results from their seeking. B) In addition, premise
(1) brings together the concepts of being a moral subject
and a moral object, thereby expressing the "compelling
Kantian idea that morality is somehow rooted in
reciprocity." C) Premise (1) accounts for the fact that
agency, rationality, sentience, and consciousness are
necessary conditions for "full human worth"--because they
are necessary for the ability to seek for value, and for the
ability to consider oneself an "I." 107
For premise (2), Sher notes that the moral virtues "are
all heightened and concentrated propensities to seek forms
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of value." Some examples that he gives are: the fair-
minded, honest person seeks to do what is right. To do
right is to increase value. The generous person seeks also
to do good. Thus, the virtuous all seek value to a greater
extent than the non-virtuous
. Since seeking value makes us
worthy, seeking more value makes us more worthy. 168
To explain (3) Sher makes use of what I have called the
"Perry Premise," from his argument for diligence. The Perry
Premise states that objects acquire value through our desire
for them. Since the virtuous have more value than the non-
virtuous, what they desire acquires more value. Everyone
desires happiness, so happiness acquires more value for the
virtuous than the non-virtuous. 169
Since even the non-virtuous have value (because they
seek value), the objects of their desires acquire value, and
therefore they ought to get those objects. The case is
strengthened for the virtuous, so premise (4) is true. 170
Premise (5) is not explicitly in the text. I assume that as
in all of his other arguments, Sher thinks that the sense of
the 'ought* in the antecedent is captured by the concept of
desert
.
I think that this argument fails. The rationales for
the first two premises are so hard to understand that I will
not bother to try to comment further on them, and the third
premise depends upon a rationale I have already criticized
at length in Chapter Five. Thus, I will make just two
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points about this argument. First of all, Sher's argument
does not "do better" than Ross in showing that there is
value in proportioning happiness to virtue. In fact, Ross
does offer some argument for his view, and it appears that
Sher has completely overlooked it. Secondly, even if it can
be shown that it ought to be the case that the virtuous are
happy (and I think a case can be made along the lines that
Ross does in The Right and the Good, rather than lines that
Sher attempts)
,
this fact is irrelevant to the question at
hand, which is, "Why do the virtuous deserve to be happy?"
Showing that it is good for the virtuous to be happy is not
at all the same as showing that the virtuous are deserving.
When he is considering what things are good, Ross makes
an argument to show that pleasure is not the only good. He
asks us to consider two different possible worlds. The
worlds are alike in the amount of pain and pleasure they
contain, as well as the amount of virtues and vices. The
difference is that in the first world, it is the virtuous
who are all happy, and the vicious who are miserable,
whereas in the second world, the vicious are happy and the
virtuous are miserable. He writes (plausibly), that "very
few people would hesitate to say that the first was a much
better state of the universe than the second ." 171 It seems
to me that an argument along these lines is far more likely
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to show that it is good for the virtuous to be happy than
anything that Sher presented.
Desert Bases Cannot be Justified
I think it is very hard to prove that the virtuous are
deserving; and as I have tried to show with George Sher's
attempts, although we can always ask for the justification
of a moral claim, we will not always get one. Eventually
there have to be some primitive claims that are justified
only by appeal to intuition or to the claim’s alleged self-
evidence. My view is just such a primitive claim. As a
matter of fact, I think that my view has the benefit of
showing how the desert bases are closely related. Many
people do not pay enough attention to desert because they
think that it is just a collection of disparate intuitions
that have no unifying theme. I hope to show that view is
mistaken
.
Since I take the connection between virtue and desert
as primitive, I can not present an argument for its truth.
Nevertheless, there are some facts that support it, such as
existence of the book When Bad Things Happen to Good
People112
,
a contemporary theodicy. Implicit in the title is
the idea that good people do not deserve bad things. But of
course, this world is not ideal, and it is very clear that
often, and maybe even more often than not, bad things happen
to good people. Another fact that indirectly helps my case
is Sher’s weak attempt to show that the virtuous deserve the
117
goods. He ends up using as premises propositions that are
either opague, or far less clearly true than what he is
trying to prove. When a claim is truly primitive, then
attempts to justify it are likely to run into problems of
this sort.
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CHAPTER 6
THE VIRTUES
In this chapter I claim that the abundance of apparent
desert bases makes desert seem little more than a bundle of,
at best, loosely connected intuitions, and that this makes
principle PJD appear ad hoc. As a solution to this problem,
I propose an account of the desert bases that is relatively
restrictive: desert is due to the fit between one's
previous deserts and receipts, one's virtuous and vicious
behavior, and one's potential for developing virtues in the
future. Since they are so important to my view about the
true desert bases, the bulk of this chapter centers on my
account of the virtues and vices.
The Plurality of Desert
Consider the amazing variation in the bases of the
different desert claims listed in Chapter Three: past
actions of all sorts, including hard work, good work,
successful work, evil deeds, risk-taking, and careful
planning; the past receipt of suffering, bad luck, and
undeserved benefits; many characteristics of the deserving,
such as beauty, moral worth, personhood, talent, being
interesting, being an expert, being fair and just; and
lastly, having fulfilled some set requirements for the
desert--being entitled to it. Thus, although every desert
claim must have a desert base, it may appear that just about
any reason will do. Furthermore, since I have shown that
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George Sher's attempts to justify the various desert bases
fails for each desert base, and since Sher's is the only
serious, sustained attempt to justify the various desert
bases, it appears that intuition is the only arbiter between
competing accounts of the desert bases. Feinberg claimed
that "the facts which constitute the basis of a subject's
desert must be facts about that subject ," 173 but this is
clearly too general to be useful. Some facts about me, such
as the fact that my middle name was chosen because it was my
mother's uncle's first name, or the fact that I have brown
hair, do not seem to be important for any desert claims
about me. It does not seem reasonable that I should deserve
anything on the basis of those facts.
These appearances lend a disreputable air to JD, the
claim that distributive justice is achieved when each person
gets what she or he deserves, because they make it appear
that JD can accommodate most any intuition about justice.
Thus, principle JD appears ad hoc, because it is so easy to
manipulate its content by choice of desert bases. I would
like to remove the appearance of ad hocery from JD. I would
like to offer principled reasons to accept certain desert
bases and to reject others. Sher claimed that "what a
person deserves is always determined either by what they
have done, or by what, in some important sense, they are ."
174
I think that this statement is on the right track, but that
the "important sense" of what a person is can be specified:
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what is important is that people are good people. I think
that what makes a person a good person is possession of the
virtues, and avoidance of the vices. Furthermore, since
virtues and vices are dispositions to act, insofar as a past
action is an exemplification of a virtue or a vice, then
that past action will also modify the desert of the agent.
So, my view (roughly) is that all desert is based upon
the possession of virtues and vices. However, there are
some auxiliary principles which modify this basic claim, so
I think it will be clearer to start with a discussion of the
virtues and vices themselves, whose features motivate these
modifications. There are two main tasks that need to be
accomplished in an adequate account of virtue: (1) an
account of the nature of virtue, and (2) a specification of
the virtues themselves. My view of the nature of virtues is
influenced by Aristotle. However, there may be many
philosophers who disagree with the Aristotelian conception
of virtue. Some of these would probably also disagree with
my modified Aristotelian view, as might some who consider
themselves to be Aristotelian. If so, then these
philosophers will also disagree with my view of the desert
bases. In fact, my claim is that the disagreements should
be linked. For instance, if you do not think that beauty is
a virtue, then you should not think that beauty is a desert
base. So, while I will present a virtue/vice theory to give
substance to my view that the desert bases are all and only
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virtues or vices, if your view of the virtues is different
from mine, then your view of the desert bases will also be
different from mine. That is no objection to my theory, so
long as the desert bases are linked to the possession of
virtues and vices in the way that I say they are.
Some Notes on the Nature of Virtue
Virtue theory is a theory about the evaluation of
persons, rather than of acts or states of affairs. A virtue
is a disposition to act in certain ways under certain
conditions. Part of what makes a particular act the
exemplification of a virtue is the motive that produced the
act. For example, Kant makes a distinction between the
grocer who does not overcharge his customers from the motive
of self-interest, and the grocer who does not overcharge
from the motive of duty . 175 Although Kant does not express
himself this way, I think this distinction corresponds to
the difference between performing a virtuous action
17b (the
action of the grocer who does not overcharge from the motive
of duty)
,
and performing a neutral action (the action of the
grocer who does not overcharge from the motive of self-
interest) .
Thus, part of what makes an action an instance of a
virtue is the motive that produced it. However, there is
another requirement, that the motive be part of a general
disposition to act. It cannot be a one-time circumstance,
but must be a developed habit. For instance, consider an
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habitual thief who has spent most of his adult life
stealing. Imagine that on one occasion, in the midst of a
theft that was going well for him, he had a change of heart,
and decided to abort his mission. The next day, however, he
went on with his schedule of stealing (a new house, not the
one where he had had an attack of conscience)
. Even if the
motivation for his aborting his theft was love of duty, or
love of his fellow humans, or the realization that he should
not steal, etc., his action would not indicate that he
possessed the relevant virtue, because it was clearly not
part of his disposition to be motivated to refrain from
stealing even though in that case, he did exemplify a
virtue
.
A comprehensive and influential conception of the
virtues can be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
Aristotle makes several points about the nature of virtue
before listing the virtues themselves. Since his remarks
are consistent with, but also more extensive than, what I
have said above, I have summarized four main points below.
First, Aristotle distinguishes between two main kinds
of virtue, moral and intellectual . 177 Intellectual virtue is
developed through learning, but moral virtue is developed
through habit. We are not born with the moral virtues, but
acquire them through performing virtuous actions. For
instance, "we become just by performing just actions... We
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may sum it all up in the generalization, 'Like activities
produce like dispositions.'" 178
Second, Aristotle makes it clear that what makes a
person virtuous is not the mere performance of virtuous
actions. The mind of the performer must be in the correct
state as well. "Actions, to be sure, are called just and
temperate when they are such as a just or temperate man
would do. But the doer is just or temperate not because he
does such things but when he does them in the way of just
and temperate persons." 179 There are three conditions to be
fulfilled for the doer to be virtuous.
(1) The agent must act in full consciousness of
what he is doing. (2) He must 'will' his action,
and will it for its own sake. (3) The act must
proceed from a fixed and unchangeable
disposition. 180
From this, it follows that the action of a non-virtuous
person can appear identical to the action of a virtuous
person. For instance, if some person's normal habit is to
lie, but on one occasion tells the truth, the liar might
appear to be virtuous. The actual instance of truth-telling
is not enough, by itself, to allow an accurate judgement of
the merit of the utterer. In this case, the liar is not to
be judged virtuous, even though he told the truth. To
become virtuous, the liar would have to become in the habit
of always telling the truth (and consciously, and for its
own sake)
.
124
Third, according to Aristotle, virtue is neither a
feeling nor a capacity, but a certain disposition
.
181 Which
dispositions are virtues? The dispositions which make a
person a good person, and make that person function well
.
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Possession of the virtues is necessary for humans to
flourish.
Fourth, Aristotle appears to claim that virtue is
always a mean between two extremes. Thus, for every virtue,
there will be two associated vices.
Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions,
in which excess is a form of failure, and so is
defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a
form of success; and being praised and being
successful are both characteristics of virtue.
Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, since as we
have seen, it aims at what is intermediate . 183
In my view, Aristotle's third point is problematic.
The third point seems to imply that humans are like tools
—
they have particular functions, and the virtues are what
allow them to perform those functions well. For instance,
the characteristic function of the saw is what it was
designed to do. Thus, the characteristic function of a saw
is to cut things, and so a virtue of the saw is sharpness.
If we apply this to people, then there is a characteristic
function of persons, and the virtues allow each person to
achieve that function. However, it does not appear that
there is a characteristic function of persons. We are not
like tools in at least one important respect: we were not
designed to do anything, either well or poorly, because we
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were not designed. So, the virtues are not those
dispositions which allow us to achieve our function.
Let me note a tension between the conception of a good
person, and the conception of a person that is good for some
particular task (a good boxer, a good military commander, a
good philosophy professor) . Above, I expressed disagreement
with Aristotle's notion that there is a characteristic
function of people, and that the virtues are what allow us
to achieve that function. I found this notion unacceptable,
because it does not seem that, in general, people have a
characteristic function. Thus, the judgment that a person
is, overall, a good person does not seem to require some
conception of what that person is good for. On the other
hand, it is often the case that a person must fulfill a
particular task, or profession. In such cases, we clearly
do judge that so-and-so would make a good doctor, or a good
lawyer, or a good carpenter. Furthermore, we also make
judgments of desert with respect to these concepts. It
seems to me that there is a difference between judging a
person good overall, and judging a person a good doctor.
However, I do think that the judgments of desert that are
made in the more narrow contexts (good doctor, good boxer)
still depend on the virtues that I enumerated in the last
chapter, as do the judgments about desert made in the
context of judging a person good overall.
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Of course, what makes a person good overall is not the
same as what makes a person a good boxer, otherwise it would
be clear that someone like Mike Tyson would not only be
judged not a good person, but that he would be judged a poor
boxer. Since we distinguish between the judgment that Mike
Tyson is a good boxer (probably true), and the judgment that
Mike Tyson is a good person (probably false)
,
we must have
different standards.
I think that this tension between the virtues that make
for a good person, and the virtues that make for a good
boxer, or good lawyer, etc., is mirrored by the conflict
between judgments of desert for a person overall, and for a
person as a boxer, or lawyer, etc. For instance, measured
by most boxing standards, Mike Tyson is one of the great
boxers (hardest hitting at least)
,
and deserves recognition
as such. However, he also deserved his prison sentence for
raping a woman, and the fact that one of his self-admitted
unforgettable punches was not even in the ring (he knocked
his (now) ex-wife into the walls of their apartment)
,
indicates that he is not deserving of many good things as
moral person . 184
Aristotle’s fourth point, about virtue being a kind of
mean, is also problematic. Although he does mention again
and again that virtue is a mean, it is not clear that he
really believes it . 185 Furthermore, whether or not Aristotle
truly affirms it, it is simply false. As Aristotle himself
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admits, there is no way of committing adultery in a moderate
way. Adultery is always a vice, no matter when, with whom,
or what way it is committed. In addition, the virtue of
justice is not presented as a mean, and neither are the
intellectual virtues. Thus, while some virtues and vices
clearly can be "tripled up" (the virtue as the mean between
two extreme vices) in a useful way, I will not follow this
device when presenting Aristotle's list.
Aristotle notes that not all virtues and vices have
names, and that some of the names he uses do not fit
exactly. He then goes into a detailed discussion of the
moral virtues, and then the intellectual virtues. I have
listed the virtues below, with related vices across from
them where appropriate. (The quotations indicate names that
Aristotle made up because there was not any in common
The Virtues and Vices
use
.
)
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Virtue
courage
magnificence
proper pride
proper ambition
temperance
liberality
good temper
truthfulness
Vice
cowardliness
rashness
"insensibility" (extreme
asceticism)
self-indulgence
meanness
prodigality
stinginess
vulgarity
undue humility
empty vanity
unambitiousness
excess ambition
"inirascibility"
irascibility
mock modesty
boastfulness
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ready wit boorishness
buffoonery
surliness
obsequiousness
bashfulness
shamelessness
friendliness
modesty
There is another kind of moral virtue, justice. But
this virtue is actually comprised of several closely related
virtues. One sense of 'justice' is that of "virtue entire."
It is possible to be virtuous in one's private dealings,
while not being virtuous in relation to one's neighbor.
Aristotle says,
...justice is often thought to be the greatest of
virtues... It is complete because he who possesses
it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but
towards his neighbor also; for many men can
exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in
their relations to their neighbor . 187
However, there are also other meanings of 'justice'
which indicate separate virtues not already listed above.
There are at least two separate kinds of justice:
distributive, and rectificatory . 188
Finally, there are five major, and three minor
intellectual virtues: Science, Art, Practical wisdom,
Intuitive reason, and Philosophic wisdom, and excellence in
deliberation, understanding, and judgment . 189 Since it may
not be clear what Aristotle intends by each of the five
major virtues, here is a brief description of them. Science
is the capacity to demonstrate one's knowledge of necessary
truths
,
190 art is the capacity to make things 191 , practical
wisdom is the capacity to achieve what is desired (the good
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ends ), 192 intuitive reason is the capacity to grasp first
principles
,
191 and philosophic wisdom is scientific knowledge
combined with intuitive reason . 194
As I noted above, Aristotle divided the virtues into
two broad categories, moral and intellectual. From the list
of moral virtues, however, it appears that he had a much
wider conception of morality than I do. For instance, he
counts friendliness and ready wit among the moral virtues.
Furthermore, he counts art among the intellectual virtues.
Again, this seems a bit of a stretch to me, but my quarrel
is not (except for a couple of exceptions that I will
mention below) with the individual virtues, it is with
Aristotle's using only two categories to classify them. I
agree that two of the important ways in which people can be
judged good are morally and intellectually, but I also think
that people can be judged artistically, athletically, and
socially. I think that there is a set of virtues for each
of these major ways of being judged good. In my virtue
scheme, I keep most of the virtues listed by Aristotle, but
some of them are classified under the different categories I
just mentioned, and there some other virtues that I add.
Here is a table of the virtues:
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Moral Intellectual Artistic Social Athletic
courage practical talent for ready wit beauty
temperance wisdom the fine friend- strength
truthful- (prudence) arts as liness hand-eye
ness rationality well good temper co-
liberality talent for as for proper ordination
(charity) intellectual crafts & pride & talentjustice activities, hobbies
:
proper for
fidelity such as painting, ambition various
diligence science, music. modesty athletic
etc
.
math, literature. leadership activities
philosophy, gardening, ability etc
.
etc
.
carpentry. cooperative
the ability
culinary etc
.
arts, etc.
Most of Aristotle's virtues appear on this list, with
the exception of magnificence. Aristotle says that "the
magnificent man is like an artist; for he can see what is
fitting and spend large sums tastefully ." 195 This does not
seem to be a moral virtue. If anything, it may be a
combination of artistic and social virtues, but I do not
think it needs a special mention on my list. Also, I put
'charity' in parentheses after 'liberality' because that is
what I understand by it. I also added two moral virtues,
fidelity and diligence. These seem to me to be dispositions
that make their bearer a better person. Finally, note that
this scheme is not meant to be an exhaustive and exclusive
list of the virtues. It is not exhaustive because there are
other virtues (many of them minor virtues) that I have not
listed. This list is not exclusive, because some virtues
seem to fit under more than one heading. For instance,
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grace of movement seems to be an athletic virtue, but
perhaps is also an artistic virtue (in a ballet dancer, for
instance) . Nevertheless, I think that list is complete
enough to provide substance to my claim that the desert
bases are either virtues or vices. Remember, if you
disagree with my chosen virtues, that is not an objection to
my view, so long as you also disagree with the corresponding
desert base. So if you do not like this list, substitute
your own. That list will, if I am correct, generate your
desert bases.
I am now ready to present my view in detail, along with
some criticisms and modifications.
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CHAPTER 7
DESERT AND VIRTUE
In this chapter, I defend the view that desert is
determined by possession of virtues and vices. I first
explain what it is for an action to exemplify a virtue and
present a couple of technical terms that make use of this
concept. Then I present the first version of my thesis, and
show that it succeeds in many cases. Then I discuss some
problem cases that force a couple of revisions to my view.
Finally, I discuss some implications of this view of desert
for PJD, the principle that distributive justice is achieved
when people get what they deserve.
The simplest view of the connection between desert and
virtue is that a person deserves good things for possessing
a virtue or acting virtuously, bad things for possessing a
vice or acting viciously, and that these two categories
exhaust the desert bases. For a person to act virtuously,
she must perform some action which both exemplifies that
virtue, and for which the virtuous disposition was a
significant motive. An action that exemplifies a particular
virtue is a typical action for that virtue. A virtue is a
disposition to do certain acts, and those acts exemplify
that virtue. For instance, truthfulness is a virtue, and an
action that exemplifies it occurs when someone tells the
truth. Or consider friendliness; it could be exemplified by
the actions involved in introducing a new member to the rest
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of the group, and. making the new person feel welcome.
Below, I have used the notion of exemplification to define
virtuous and vicious actions.
VirA An agent, s, performed a virtuous
action, a =df. a is an action that s
performed, a exemplifies a virtue, v,
and a significant part of s'
s
motive for
doing a was either v, or the same
intentions that one who possessed v and
performed a would have.
VicA An agent, s, performed a vicious action,
a =df. a is an action that s performed,
a exemplifies a vice, v, and a
significant part of s's motive for doing
a was either v, or the same intentions
that one who possessed v and performed a
would have.
Note that a person does not have to possess a virtue in
order to do a virtuous action (nor does he or she have to
possess a vice in order to do a vicious action) . This is
somewhat different from what Aristotle claimed. To be able
to say that someone acted virtuously, he required that the
person’s action must "proceed from a firm and unchangeable
character ." 196 But I think that a person can begin to act
virtuously without already possessing the virtue, that is,
without already having a fixed and unchangeable character
from whence the action proceeds. My idea is that a person
acts virtuously (or viciously) when she or he acts the way
person would who had the relevant virtue (or vice)
.
A
person without some particular virtue can act similarly to
the way a person would who had that virtue. This happens
sze (24 Jjt
a
especially when a person is learning a particular virtue.
134
As Aristotle said, "we must become just by doing just
acts." 197 So, because the person has not before now had the
disposition to be just, one just act is not enough for him
to be judged to possess the virtue of justice.
Nevertheless, that instance, if from the right motive, is a
virtuous action. It counts positively towards his desert.
On the other hand, consider a person who could be said to
possess the virtue of truthfulness. Suppose that person one
day breaks down and tells a serious lie. If that one lie
was the only one he told, he could not be said to possess
the vice of mendacity. Yet his action was vicious, and
counts negatively toward his desert. Thus, one does not
need to actually possess a virtue or vice in order to act
virtuously or viciously.
However, since virtues and vices are dispositions, and
it seems that some desert is based on the possession of a
disposition without any obvious action, it is also possible
for someone to deserve without having performed the relevant
action. Thus, some desert is based on the possession of a
certain disposition, without specifying any particular
virtuous or vicious action.
With the above definitions, the first version of the
relationship between virtues, vices, and desert can be
stated.
VD1 An agent deserves something good (bad)
in virtue of his or her action, a, or
disposition, d, only if a was a virtuous
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(vicious) action, or d is a virtue
(vice)
.
I think that VD1 captures an important insight about
the connection between desert, virtue, and vice.
Furthermore, in many cases it agrees with intuitions about
when a person is deserving. For instance, the following
desert claims from Chapter Three all have either virtuous or
vicious actions, or virtues or vices for their grounds.
1. Jones deserves her success; she's worked
hard for it.
3. Walters deserves the job; she's the best
qualified applicant.
6. Baker deserves to win; he's played
superbly.
7. Miss Vermont deserves to win; she's the
prettiest entrant.
8. Anderson deserves his twenty-year
sentence; he planned the murder.
9. Brown may have known she wouldn't be
caught, but she still deserves to be
punished.
12. Benson deserves some good luck; he's a
fine person.
14. McArthur deserves a hearing; he's an
expert on the subject.
22. Martin deserves to be punished; he lied
to Jackson and Burns about ringing up
yesterday.
23. Nolan deserved the prize for her
efforts; her painting was by far the
best
.
25. McKenzie deserves to go to jail; he
robbed that old lady.
The ground of claim (1) is diligence, a moral virtue.
Claim (3) appeals to a set of virtues which the candidate
possesses. Included are probably several social virtues,
plus some intellectual and (perhaps) moral virtues. The
grounds of (6) and (7) are athletic virtue and physical
beauty. Claims (8), (9), (22), and (25) seem to be grounded
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in various moral vices (it is hard to know for sure, since
these claims are very sketchy, but it is at least
plausible)
. Claim (12) is grounded in the goodness of
Benson, which would presumably indicate that he possesses
several virtues. Claim (14) is grounded by an intellectual
virtue. Finally, claim (23) is grounded by artistic virtue.
Problems for the Simple View
I think that VD1 is on the right track about the
relationship between virtue and vice to desert. However,
there is a range of very plausible desert claims whose
desert bases cannot be considered virtues or vices. Here
are four cases where the subjects seem deserving, but it is
not the case that the desert is due to virtuous or vicious
behavior
.
Case 1: Suppose an innocent person suffers a natural
disaster. For instance, suppose a farmer's corn is wiped
out by a tornado. It seems that now this person deserves
some compensation. This is not deserved because of any
virtue, but because of the past receipt of the person. Of
course, one reason the disaster is undeserved is that the
person was innocent, and so did not deserve such a mishap.
But the disaster happened. The person did not get her just
desert
.
Case 2: Suppose a rich, famous athlete murders a guy,
and the victim's parents then sue him for millions of
dollars. They deserve recompense for the loss of their
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child, and it is only fitting that the murderer's fortune
should be forfeit to them. The parents' desert is not based
on anything that they have done (or failed to do) . It is
based on the wrong that was done to them.
Case 3: Imagine that a married couple with a young
child find that their marriage cannot work. They get a
divorce. Neither party has done anything particularly bad
to the other. There were no beatings, intimidations, or
adulterous acts. The two found that they had irreconcilable
differences in religions, politics, etc. They could not get
along. In this case, suppose that the wife had not pursued
a career after marriage, so that after the divorce, she had
no means of supporting herself or her child. She needs
money, a job, day-care for her child. It seems that she
deserves to get these things. This desert is based, not on
her virtue, but on her need.
Case 4: In Chapter Three, I presented the following
desert claim involving bad luck as a desert base, taken from
Sher's list of initially plausible desert claims:
13. Gordon deserves some good luck; she's had only bad.
To flesh out this example a bit, imagine that Gordon has
been playing bridge with some friends. She's played well,
but all night has had only miserable hands, each less than
ten points. To make matters worse, her partner has not had
very good hands either. It is plausible to think that
because Gordon has had bad luck all evening, she deserves
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some compensation. It seems that she deserves to get a
better hand.
So here are four cases of desert that seem to involve
grounds other than either virtue or vice. Instead, the
grounds are (1) suffering a natural disaster, (2) suffering
at the hands of an evil man, (3) need, and (4) bad luck.
While it might appear that these cases are four separate
reasons to reject VD1, I think that each of these four cases
has something important in common with the other three. In
each case, there has been a poor fit with respect to the
subjects' past deserts and past receipts. In case (1), the
farmer had done nothing to deserve such a natural disaster.
The same is true of the parents in case (2)
.
They had not
done anything to deserve the severe harm imposed upon them
(not to mention upon their son--he had not done anything to
deserve being murdered) by the rich athlete. In case (3),
the separated mother did not deserve to be in such need--she
was as innocent as her husband in their divorce. Finally,
in case (4), Gordon had been playing well, and long enough
that evening, that she should have got a good hand at least
once. Thus, while there were different reasons for the poor
fit between desert and receipt in each case, it was that
poor fit that was the ground for the desert.
So it is clear that desert is affected by receipts as
well as virtues and vices. The fit between what a person
has previously deserved and received is a feature that I
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think must be taken account of in all desert no matter what
other desert bases there are. It is independent of desert
bases, but is fairly empty until those bases have been
specified. The match between desert and receipt is part of
the fundamental concept of desert. All desert claims
require a deserver, a desert, and a reason why the deserver
deserves the desert, as well the correct match between past
receipts and deserts.
So VD1 is an incomplete account of the determinants of
desert. There is another factor that must be incorporated
into the account.
Past Receipts
To modify VD1, I must introduce some new concepts. I
need the concepts of a virtue desert-level and a vice
desert-level, each of them time-relativized. These indicate
what a person deserves at a time, based upon all his or her
virtuous and vicious dispositions and behavior up to that
time. I also need to make use of the concepts of a goods-
received-level at a time, and a evils-received-level at a
time. These indicate the total amount of good and bad
things that the person has received up to that time.
Finally, I need a comparison between the goods deserved and
received, and the evils deserved and received. These are
measures of how well a person's deserts and receipts match
up. They determine whether a person deserves anything at a
time. Roughly, the idea is that people are deserving of
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good things only if they have done virtuous actions, or have
virtuous dispositions, and have not yet received anything
good for them; and that people are deserving of bad things
only if they have done vicious actions, or have vicious
dispositions, and have not yet received anything bad for
them; otherwise they are not deserving of anything.
A person's Virtuous Desert Level at a time is the
amount of good things that she deserves in virtue of her
virtuous dispositions or actions up to that time. This
Virtuous Desert Level is independent of any goods that she
might have already received, but to determine her actual
deserts, this must be modified by her past receipts. So, a
person's Goods-Received Level at a time is the amount of
good things that she has received for her virtuous
dispositions or actions up to that time; and a person's
Deserved Goods Match is computed by comparing her Virtuous
Desert Level to her Goods-Received Level. If a person's
Virtuous Desert Level is higher than her Goods-Received
Level, then her Deserved Goods Match is positive, indicating
that she still deserves some goods for her virtuous
dispositions or actions that she has not received. On the
other hand, if a person's Goods-Received Level is higher
than her Virtuous Desert Level, then her Deserved Goods
Match is negative, indicating that she has received more
good things than she deserves for her virtuous dispositions
or actions. Finally, if a person's Virtuous Desert Level is
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equal to her Goods Received Level, then her Deserved Goods
Match is zero, indicating that she has received exactly the
goods she deserves for her virtuous dispositions or actions.
For convenience, a person's Deserved Goods Match is
represented by a real number, n, between -1 and +1. If n is
positive, then the larger the value of n, the more her
virtuous dispositions or actions have not been rewarded. If
n = +1, then she has not received any of the goods that she
deserves for her virtuous dispositions or actions. If n is
negative, then the smaller the value of n, the more goods
she has received in excess of what she deserves for her
virtuous dispositions or actions. If n = -1, then she has
not deserved any of the goods that she has received for her
virtuous dispositions or actions.
A person's Vicious Desert Level and Evils-Received
Level together determine his Deserved Evils Match. These
concepts correspond to a person's Virtuous Desert Level,
Goods-Received Level, and Deserved Goods Match,
respectively, except that they involve vicious dispositions,
vicious actions, and deserved evils rather than virtuous
dispositions, virtuous actions, and deserved goods. Past
receipt plays the same role in determining a person's
Deserved Evils Match as it does in determining his Deserved
Goods Match.
Lastly, a person's Deserved Evils Match is also
represented by a real number between -1 and +1. If a
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person's Vicious Desert Level is higher than his Evils-
Received Level, then his Deserved Evils Match is positive,
indicating that he still deserves some as yet un-received
goods for his vicious dispositions or actions. On the other
hand, if a person's Evils-Received Level is higher than his
Vicious Desert Level, then his Deserved Evils Match is
negative, indicating that he has received more evil things
than he deserves for his vicious dispositions or actions.
Finally, if a person's Vicious Desert Level is equal to his
Evils-Received Level, then his Deserved Evils Match is zero,
indicating that he has received exactly the evils he
deserves for his vicious dispositions or actions.
These concepts are summarized below, where s is an
agent, and t is a time.
VRDL s's Virtuous Desert Level at t =df. the
amount of good things that s deserves in
virtue of s's virtuous dispositions or
actions up to t.
VCDL s's Vicious Desert Level at t =df. the
amount of bad things that s deserves in
virtue of s's vicious dispositions or
actions up to t.
GRL s's Goods-Received Level at t =df. the
amount of good things that s has
received for s's virtuous dispositions
or actions up to t.
ERL s's Evils-Received Level at t =df. the
amount of bad things that s has received
for s's vicious dispositions or actions
up to t.
DGM s's Deserved Goods Match at t =df. a
number, -1 <= n <= +1, such that n
represents the degree to which s has got
the goods that s deserves up to t, where
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(i) n = 0 indicates an exact match
between desert and receipt of goods,
(ii) n > 0 indicates that s has not
received all the goods that s deserves,
and (iii) n < 0 indicates that s has
received more goods than s deserves.
DEM s's Deserved Evils Match at t =df. a
number, -1 <= n <= +1, such that n
represents the degree to which s has got
the evils that s deserves up to t, where
(i) n = 0 indicates an exact match
between desert and receipt of evils,
(ii) n > 0 indicates that s has not
received all the evils that s deserves,
and (iii) n < 0 indicates that s has
received more evils than s deserves.
With these definitions, I can present the relationship
between virtues, vices, virtuous and vicious actions, past
receipts, and desert. Roughly, the relationship is this:
one's virtuous dispositions or actions make one deserving of
good things so long as one has not already received them;
one's vicious dispositions or actions make one deserving of
bad things so long as one has not already received them; and
if one receives an undeserved evil, then one deserves
something good in compensation. This idea is expressed in
VD2, below (again, s is an agent, t is a time, and in
addition, x is a desert)
.
VD2 : VDg and VD E .
VDG s deserves something good at t if and
only if
(1) s's Deserved Goods Match is
positive at t, or
(2) s's Deserved Evils Match is
negative at t.
VD e s deserves something bad at t if and
only if
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(3) s's Deserved Evils Match is
positive at t.
The three parts of VD2 capture the three general kinds
of desert: reward, punishment, and compensation. According
to clause (1), if you have done something virtuous, or have
possessed a virtue, before now, then you deserve a reward
now if you have not already been rewarded. According to
clause (3), if you have done something vicious before now,
or have possessed a vice, then you deserve punishment now if
you have not already been punished. Finally, according to
clause (2), if you have received more evils then you deserve
up to now, then you deserve compensation now for having
received those evils.
In VD2, there is no clause about your now deserving
something bad for having previously received more goods than
you deserved, because I do not think that you do deserve
evils for having received more goods than you have
virtuously deserved. Compensation is not symmetrical.
Though we do deserve recompense for undeserved bad fortune,
we do not deserve to be punished for undeserved good
fortune. Of course, if you have received more than you
virtuously deserve, then your Deserved Goods Match will be
negative, and so you will not deserve any more goods until
you have "caught up," so to speak, with your receipts. But
this is not the same as saying that you deserve to have some
of your receipts taken away.
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Principle VD2 explains why the deservers in cases (1-4)
above are deserving. In each case, the Deserved Evils Match
is negative, so the people involved deserve recompense. In
case (1) the farmer's corn was wiped out, a bad thing that
she did not deserve, because she had not done anything
vicious enough to deserve it. Thus, her Deserved Evils
Match is negative. She deserves recompense. The parents in
case (2) also had a negative Deserved Evils Match; they did
not deserve to suffer the loss of their son because of any
of their vicious actions, so they too deserve recompense.
In case (3)
,
the divorced mother has needs because of a
radical change in her living situation. In her case, the
divorce was a bad thing that happened to her. Of course,
there was a sense in which she brought the divorce on
herself, because she willingly signed the divorce papers.
But I specified that in this case the divorce was a result
of irreconcilable differences between the husband and wife,
and that neither of them was "at fault." Thus, I think this
case falls under the same general scheme that others fall
under. The woman suffered a bad thing which she did not
deserve; her Deserved Evils Match was negative, so she
deserves recompense. Finally, case (4) is no different from
the others, except in scale. What Gordon suffered was
unusually bad luck at cards, and she did not deserve it.
Her deserved recompense is correspondingly small. But this
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is still a case where her Deserved Evils Match was negative,
however slightly, so she deserves to get a good hand.
VD2 also has no problems with another kind of case,
where two people are equally virtuously and viciously
deserving (say they are twins), but one has received a lot
more good things than the other. If a third person (their
mother) is in a position to benefit either of them, then VD2
will inform her that the one with the greater inequality
between past receipts and deserts is the more deserving.
So there are a range of cases that VD1 was not able to
handle, but which VD2 is successful at, in addition to the
cases that VD1 was successful with. Since it seems to me
that all desert depends upon what a person has received, 198 I
do not find VD2 an unacceptable modification of VD1
.
However, I think that there is a closer connection between
desert and the virtues and vices than VD2 posits, and so I
would like to strengthen the claim made there. But a
stronger version of VD2 is more controversial, and will
require some modification in turn. I will discuss the
strengthened version of VD2, plus two objections, in the
next section.
Insipidity
I would like to make the claim that there is a virtue
(or vice) involved in every desert-claim:
VD3 (A) s is deserving if and only if
s has some virtue or vice; and
(B) VDG and VDE .
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VD3 is more restrictive than VD2 in two ways. First,
according to VD2, a person does not actually have to possess
a virtue or a vice in order to deserve something. It is
sufficient that the person has, on one occasion, acted like
a virtuous or vicious person (so long as this act makes the
person's DGM or DEM positive) . VD3 requires more. It
requires not only that a person act like a virtuous or
vicious person, but that the person actually have some
virtue or vice. Second, VD2 does not even require that a
person act like a virtuous person in order to be deserving
of something good. According to clause (2) of VD2, if a
person had not performed any virtuous or vicious actions,
but had received some disaster, then the person would
deserve recompense. Thus, in clause (2), there is no
connection between virtue and desert, and there is no more
than a fairly tenuous connection between vice and desert.
To deserve a positive desert, it suffices that the person
has refrained from any vicious actions and has suffered a
disaster. On the other hand, according to VD3, it is not
enough just to be needy, or to be suffering. The person
must also have some virtue (it does not necessarily need to
be innocence)
.
It might appear that there is a clear counter-example
to VD3: imagine a person who has no virtues and no vices (I
characterize such a one as insipid) . He deserves nothing
good and nothing bad. But suppose he gets hit, through no
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fault of his own, by a major disaster. Then it seem that he
deserves compensation. This desert cannot be based on any
virtue or vice, since it has been stipulated that he has
none. 199 Furthermore, we can imagine that he has not
performed any virtuous or vicious actions. He has truly
been insipid.
This example would show that VD3 is false, except that
this example is impossible. It might sound reasonable at
first consideration, but upon closer scrutiny it becomes
clear that no insipid persons could exist. There is too
close a connection between at least some of the virtues and
vices. Although not all virtues are means, it does seem
that Aristotle was right about several of the virtues being
means, e.g. temperance, courage, and proper ambition. A
temperate person has a disposition that is neither too
ascetic nor too self-indulgent. There is a continuum along
which all dispositions concerned with seeking pleasure must
lie. Either the disposition is to seek pleasure too often,
or too rarely, or somewhere in the middle (of course, the
borders between too little, just right, and too much are
vague, but that does not matter)
.
Everyone must have some
disposition or other toward seeking pleasure. So everyone
must have some virtue or vice. The same point can be made
for courage, the mean between cowardice and rashness, and
for proper ambition, the mean between overweening zeal and
sloth
.
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Furthermore, other virtues that are not means do seem
to have complementary vices, e.g. charitableness and hard-
heartedness, fidelity and infidelity, diligence and
laziness, and rationality and irrationality. If a person is
not charitable, then she must tend toward hard-heartedness,
or at least selfishness. A person whose word is
untrustworthy is a person who lacks fidelity, and it seems
that everyone is either more or less diligent or lazy, and
more or less rational or irrational. Thus, I do not think
that there can be insipid adults, so the example fails to
show that VD3 is false. But it suggests a more severe
problem, that of the desert of children.
Children
Above, I argued that there could be no insipid adults,
due to the close connection between certain virtues and
vices. But very young children have not yet had time to
develop any dispositions, and they may have no past
sufferings to make up for, so it would appear that on my
account, very young children almost never deserve anything.
But this seems wrong, so it seems that there is a problem
with my account.
It does seem that in many ways, children cannot deserve
the same things that adults can. For instance, it is absurd
to think that a very young child could deserve a large
promotion, or first prize in a body-building competition, or
a Pulitzer prize. And in part, this is because children at
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that uge cannot posssss ths relevant virtues. Furthermore,
children are not expected to be as moral as adults. We
realize that they do not have the same judgment, clarity of
thought, and training to make many of the moral decisions
that adults make. Both secular law and religion make this
distinction. All of this seems to have implications about
virtuous and vices in children: it seems reasonable to
suppose that children do not have as much ability to display
virtue and vice as adults. Therefore, it would seem that if
VD3 is true, then children are generally less deserving (of
both good and bad things) than adults.
However, it does seem that such young children deserve
something. They deserve the chance to develop their budding
virtues which might someday make them deserving of those
grand deserts. This desert is clearly not based on any past
receipts, and is also not based in any straightforward way
on their present virtues, because children have at most the
rudiments of virtues. I think that this desert is based on
the potential of children to develop their virtues. This
potential needs nurturing to have a chance to be fully
developed, and so I think that children deserve to get those
things that they need to develop their virtues based on the
potential of those virtues. For instance, musical talent is
sometimes evident from a very young age. In such cases, it
seems clear that the child deserves the kind of environment
that will give him or her the chance to develop that virtue.
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Thus, I need to modify VD3 to take into account the desert
due a person for his or her potential virtues.
Although I introduced this modification in the context
of what children deserve, I think it applies generally to
anyone who has an undeveloped virtue through no fault of his
or her own. For instance, a person may not realize that she
has the potential to be a very good runner until late in
life. Mavis Lungren is a veteran runner who has set
numerous age-group records at distances from the mile to the
marathon. She did not start running until in her fifties.
But when she did, it was apparent very quickly that she had
a lot of talent. She deserved the chance to develop that
running talent no less than a high-school boy who runs a
sub-four minute mile. Thus, the modification to VD3 is
applicable to all persons, not just children. Of course, if
a person has neglected a virtue for most of his life through
laziness, it is not so clear that he would deserve, at the
age of eighty, all the conditions necessary to develop that
virtue. Only those virtues that have been undeveloped for
reasons beyond the person's control, and suddenly appear
later in life, can cause the person to deserve something not
based on past receipts or previous actions.
VD4 : VDGp and VDEp .
VDGp s deserves something good at t if and
only if
(1) s's Deserved Goods Match is
positive at t and s has some
virtue or vice at t, or
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( 2 ) s'
s
Deserved Evils Match is
negative at t, and s has some
virtue or vice at t, or
(3) through no fault of s' s, s has
a potential virtue that s has
not developed, and that good
is necessary for s to develop
that virtue.
VDEp s deserves something bad at t if and
only if
(4) s ' s Deserved Evils Match is
positive at t and s has some
virtue or vice at t.
Principle VD4 represents my most developed view about
the connection between desert, and the virtues and vices.
It takes into account three general types of desert:
reward, punishment, and compensation; and it takes into
account the idea that those who can develop virtues deserve
to get the chance to do so. In addition, I have shown that
VD4 can successfully account for a wide variety of desert
claims. In the next section, I will discuss several alleged
desert bases that might appear to ground desert claims that
VD4 would not ground.
Other Alleged Desert Bases
Besides virtues, vices, and past receipt, the following
characteristics are plausible desert bases: suffering,
need, autonomous action, personhood, success, and
entitlement. In this section, I will show that suffering,
need, autonomous action, and personhood are not needed as
separate desert bases if VD4 is true, because VD4 accounts
for the plausibility of each of them. Then I will argue
that success is not a desert base. Finally, I will argue
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that entitlement is not a desert base either, but because
entitlement is more complicated, it will be discussed in the
next section.
Suffering and need seem to me to be closely related,
since many people who are in need can be said to be
suffering. Furthermore, if a person’s need is due to her
own negligence, then we are unlikely to think she deserves
any help. Thus, innocent need is more plausible as a desert
base than just general need. I think the same is true of
suffering. If a person deliberately brings about her own
suffering through some vice, then it is not so plausible
that the person deserves compensation. Need and suffering
are not virtues or vices. Thus, on my account they cannot
be desert bases. However, as I have just noted, both are
much more plausible if they are attributed to innocent
people. This suggests that the plausibility of these two
kinds of situation as desert-inducing can be explained by
the fact that each case is an instance of a virtuous person
being wronged. In each case the Deserved Evils Match (DEM)
is negative, so the person deserves compensation. Thus, I
think that VD4 can account for the plausible cases of desert
involving need and suffering. Cases (1-4) above are
specific instances of involving need and suffering, and I
have shown how they are handled by my principle.
According to George Sher, autonomous action is a desert
base. 200 His view is that persons deserve the expected
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consequences of their freely-chosen actions. I have
discussed his account at some length in Chapter Four, and
showed that even the most plausible formulation of his view
had grave defects. In addition, the claims that appear to
have motivated Sher's account of autonomous action can be
accounted for by appeal to VD4
.
1) Wilson, who knowingly submitted his
application late, deserves to be
disqualified
.
2) Harris, who didn't bring his raincoat,
now deserves to get wet, while Georgina,
who did bring her umbrella, deserves to
stay dry.
3) Simmons, who didn't study for his exam,
now deserves to fail.
4) Given the warm weather lately, anyone
who is crazy enough to drive their
vehicle on the ice deserves to have it
fall through.
5) Persons who resourcefully seize
opportunities deserve the resulting
benefits
.
6) Persons who carefully make and execute
plans deserve success.
7) Persons who forego immediate benefits in
expectation of longer-range gains
deserve those gains.
It seems to me that anyone who accepts any of (1-7)
above as legitimate desert claims can do so without appeal
to Sher's expected consequences account of desert. For
instance, although (1) is really too vague to be sure about,
it could be a case of desert due to laziness. Examples (6)
and (7) seem to me to examples of desert due to diligence or
hard work or effort. Example (5) could either be a desert
due to the possession of certain character traits such as
boldness and resourcefulness, or again desert due to
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diligence, it is hard to tell because it is stated so
vaguely. Finally, claims (2-4) seem to me to be based on a
presumed standard of rationality. Thus, every one of these
claims involves virtues or vices, and so Sher's account is
not only flawed, but unnecessary.
Personhood seems to be a likely candidate for a desert
base, and it is not plausible to think that it is a virtue,
either. However, I think that personhood is not in fact a
desert base. Nevertheless, I think I can explain why it is
often plausible to think that personhood is a desert base,
even though it is not. One important thing about personhood
is that it is closely connected to morality, and the virtues
and vices. Thus, to say that something is a person
presupposes that it has the capacity for virtue and vice.
So, it seems to me that the reason that personhood seems to
be a plausible candidate for a desert base is that the
concept contains the moral elements that are, by themselves,
desert bases. Personhood probably requires more than moral
capacity, but it is this part that makes the person
deserving
.
Finally, success is sometimes claimed to be a desert
base. For instance, suppose that two women are making
equally conscientious, energetic, and intelligent efforts to
find their friend's lost book, and that one of them finds
it. Michael Slote claims that in this case, there is some
plausibility to the view that the successful searcher
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deserves something more than unsuccessful searcher, even
though the failure of the unsuccessful searcher can be
attributed only to bad luck or accident, and not some defect
on her part." 01 If the successful searcher truly deserves
something more than the unsuccessful searcher, then success
is a desert base, because there is no other relevant
difference between the two searchers. This would be an
objection to VD4, because success is clearly not a virtue.
However, my view is that if the two searchers are truly just
as rational, diligent, etc., then they are equally
deserving. It may not be as clear that the two women have
equal desert in this case as that they have equal moral
worth in this case, but that is not an objection to VD4. 202
Since VD4 is a substantive principle, it is not trivially
true, and will sometimes clarify positions where are
intuitions are confused. And after all, it always seems
possible to ask if a person deserves her success, which
would be a strange fact if success were truly a ground for
desert
.
It is true that in the real world we tend to reward
success, but I think this is for at least three different
reasons. First, success can be a sign that a person has
been diligent, rational, etc. Second, it is often expedient
to reward success because it encourages good work, and
brings about good things in general for those who do the
rewarding. Third, very often the reward has been promised
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to the successful. It seems to me that only the first
reason for rewarding success is legitimately concerned with
desert. The second kind of reason has nothing to do with
morality, justice, or desert, but with prudence. The third
reason is entitlement, and I will argue (below) that it is
not a desert base. Thus, I do not think that there are good
reasons to think that success is a desert base.
Entitlement
Entitlement, that is, being entitled to something
either because of some law, or because of some moral
convention, is not a desert base. Many of the laws are set
up to reflect some of our intuitions about desert, in
particular laws governing criminal behavior and laws
governing civil suits. Thus, a convicted criminal can
deserve the punishment that the law prescribes, and the
tobacco companies may deserve to be forced to pay both
compensatory and punishing fines to the states. However, in
each case, the punishment is deserved because of the
virtuous or vicious actions of those involved, not from the
fact that the law prescribes it. Furthermore, it is clear
that one can be entitled to a thing, and not deserve it.
For example, a lazy stick-in-the-mud inherits the family
fortune. Given the laws of this land, the lazy good-for-
nothing is entitled to that fortune. However, this is a
circumstance where the inheritance of that fortune does not
seem deserved. On the other hand, a person may be
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deserving/ but not entitled to some benefit. One example
might be a devoted care-taker of an elderly millionaire.
That care-taker may deserve some benefit from the estate of
the millionaire, but may not get it because the millionaire
leaves it all to her no-good son. Thus, the care-taker is
deserving, but not entitled, while the son is entitled, but
not deserving, with respect to the millionaire’s estate.
Entitlement also occurs in non-legal areas. For
instance, if a father promises to take his daughter to a
horse show, she is entitled to go to that horse show
(assuming she does not in the meanwhile commit some
egregious crime which would leave no choice but for the
father to send her to her room for the day) . So, promise-
making confers entitlement. Sometimes people even say
things like, "Look, you promised me that money, so I deserve
to get it." These statements are not literally true. The
person may be entitled to that money, but just the fact of
the promise does not make the person deserving of that
money.
The position that entitlement is not a legitimate
desert base is somewhat controversial. Several writers have
defended entitlement as a desert base, so I will consider
those arguments. Fred Feldman has suggested several
examples where, he claims, a person may be deserving of some
good for one main reason— the person is entitled to that
good. Here are two of them . 203
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Case 1: Imagine two identical twins that not only look
identical, but also have highly similar pasts. Each has had
the same advantages and disadvantages as the other in home
life and schooling. They went to the same college, and
majored in the same discipline. They received the same
grades and got similar jobs in the same company. They have
also been as behaviorally identical as possible. They have
made the same moral and immoral choices, etc. They have the
same amount of money and are equally happy. One day each
twin goes into the local food-mart and buys a lottery
ticket. The only important difference in the tickets is
this: one is a losing ticket, and one is the winning
ticket. The next day, there is one major difference between
the receipts of these twins. The one with the winning
ticket is now a millionaire, while the one with the losing
ticket is not. There seems to be no injustice in this
situation. They each agreed to take part in a fair lottery,
and one of them was very lucky. Recall from Chapter Two the
principle about distributive justice and desert.
PDJd An institutional framework is
distributively just if and only if it
leads to distributions in which each
person's receipt is equal to his/her
desert
.
If you do not like talk about institutional frameworks,
then consider principle PJD.
PJD A distribution of goods and evils, d,
over a population of people, p, is
perfectly just during time interval, tl-
t2, if and only if under d, each person
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in p gets what s/he deserves durinq tl-
1
2
.
If PDJd or PJD is true, then if some distribution of
goods is just, then each person must be getting what she or
he deserves. Since the twins' situation is just, each twin
must be getting what he deserves. Up until now, the twins
have deserved (and received) the same things. There is no
reason to think that one twin might have more virtues or
needs than the other, or that the one's past receipts were
significantly less than the other's. So, the reason why one
twin deserves the millions that he has just won is that he
purchased the winning lottery ticket in a fair lottery. He
deserves the money only because he is entitled to it.
Case 2: Again, imagine identical twins with identical
past actions, past receipts, virtues, etc. They have a rich
aunt, who for her own reasons, decides to leave three
fourths of her fortune to the twin named "Abigail," and only
one fourth to the twin sister named "Lisa." Suppose that
Lisa is outraged, and steals one third of the money that
Abigail received. Now Lisa is satisfied, since each twin
has the same amount of inherited fortune as the other twin.
However, Abigail now has a legitimate complaint against
Lisa. Lisa stole money that was not hers, and Abigail
deserves to get it back. So there are two competing desert
claims. Lisa's claim is that she deserved to receive just
as much of her aunt's fortune as Abigail—Abigail did not
deserve three fourths of that fortune. On the other hand,
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once the will was drawn up and executed, Lisa no longer
deserved that money. When she stole it from Abigail, Lisa
did not deserve it. According to Feldman, while we might
agree that before their aunt's will was made the sisters
deserved equal portions from the fortune, after the will
became active, the twins' deserts changed. Clearly then,
since there was no change in the virtues, past receipts, or
past actions of either of the twins, the operative desert
base must have been entitlement.
I find both of these cases utterly unpersuasive, but
especially the second. I will respond to it first. First
of all, wills are arbitrary and entirely legal in nature.
See my comments above. The mere fact that a person has been
willed something hardly seems to provide any reason to think
that she or he deserves it, or that it is fitting that she
or he receive it. Second, the case is needlessly
complicated by the introduction of the theft. Of course,
even on a view where entitlement is not a desert base, there
will be conflict. On the one hand, the twins are equally
deserving of the money, but this conflicts with the legal
claims of the sisters. So there is conflict--Lisa deserves
as much money as Abigail, but Abigail is entitled to the
amount specified in the will, and that is more than the
amount to which Lisa is entitled. The implicit judgment is
that it was wrong for Lisa to steal the money from Abigail.
If we agree with this, we need no recourse to desert. After
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all, there is no direct connection between what a person
deserves, and what that person is permitted to do. Deserts
do not entail moral oughts. Thus, there is no mystery why
it might be the case that a) Lisa is deserving of an equal
amount of fortune to Abigail, b) Abigail is entitled to more
fortune than Lisa c) Lisa is not entitled to the money she
stole from Abigail, d) Abigail is entitled to get her money
back, and e) it was morally wrong for Lisa to steal the
money from Abigail.
In case (1), it is my view that the lottery does not
produce a just distribution of goods. Thus, it is not the
case that there is no injustice in the one twin getting
millions and the other getting nothing. I think there are
two main reasons why case (1) appears plausible, but I think
that they are based on confusion and error. First, it is an
important feature of the example that the lottery is deemed
to be fair, and fairness is often equated with justice. But
in this case, that would be a confusion between two
different kinds of justice, procedural and distributive.
Distributive justice is the kind of justice that PJD is
about: the distribution of goods and evils throughout a
population. According to PJD, there is more justice in a
population where the goods and evils are distributed
according to desert than in a population where they are not.
Procedural justice is different. It is concerned with the
methods used to bring the distribution about. If the
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methods are appropriate, then procedural justice is done.
The distinction between procedural and distributive justice
is often clearest in a court of law. Consider the Simpson
criminal trial. In that case, many people think that
justice was not done. They think that Simpson did not get
the verdict that he deserved. The outcome was not
distributively just, though the method used to achieve it
was procedurally just. The judge did not favor the
prosecution or defense, the jury was not rigged, the
specific procedures dictated by the law were all carried
through. Thus, if there was a miscarriage of justice, it
was not in the procedural realm. So, it is clear that it is
possible for distributive justice to be violated even while
procedural justice is maintained.
I think that this is what happened in the lottery case.
The lottery was fair, and procedurally just. It did not
favor any participants (except on the basis of the number of
tickets bought, which is part of the rules) . Nevertheless,
distributive justice was not maintained, because the goods
were not distributed according to desert. So, the fact that
the lottery was procedurally just had no bearing on whether
or not the lottery was distributively just, but this may
have been obscured by the fact that the lottery was
considered "fair," which is ambiguous between the two kinds
of justice.
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Someone who is not confused by the ambiguity of 'fair'
may still think that in the lottery case, the results were
just because the participants all consented to take part.
None of the lottery-ticket buyers were in any way threatened
or harassed about their purchase. Each agreed to risk a
small amount of money on a negligible chance of winning a
huge amount of money, therefore the lottery was just. One
philosopher who has articulated a position like this is
Michael Slote. He claims.
If certain equalities or inequalities are freely
consented to, then the society that creates these
equalities or inequalities can be perfectly just,
no matter whether those equalities or inequalities
are deserved or not . 204
For example, suppose that each member of a group is
equally deserving, but that one member is very well-liked,
and so everyone freely consents to give this popular person
more than she deserves. In this case, the distribution of
goods is perfectly just even though one person gets more
than she deserves, and the rest get less than they
deserve . 205 Thus, it appears that Slote would accept that
the lottery case is just, and that PJD needs to be modified
to take into account free consent. Such a modification
could be made, but I think it would be a mistake . 206 I think
that Slote is mistaken to include consent in his account of
justice. In the example above, my intuition is dead-
opposite of Slote' s: the undeserved extra goods that go to
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the popular woman make the distribution unjust, and the fact
that everyone agrees makes no difference to that injustice.
Of course, we have to be careful when considering this
case. It is so sketchy that we might be inclined to agree
that it is just for the popular woman to get extra goods
because we think that she must possess some extra virtue
that makes her so well-liked. But it has been stipulated
that everyone is equally deserving, so if this woman has
more social virtues that lead to her being so popular, then
she must have counterbalancing vices that make her desert no
more than anyone else’s. Given that each member is equally
deserving, it seems unjust for the goods to be distributed
other than equally to all. For various reasons, we often
consent to harmful or painful situations. I subject myself
to the torture of writing a dissertation because of the
future gains that it will give me. But it would be a
mistake to think that because I consent to this pain, that
it is not painful. The same is true of justice. We may for
various reasons consent to unjust situations, for instance,
when we think that happiness counts for more than justice,
or when we show mercy. 207 But that does not make the
situations we consent to less unjust.
Strangely enough, Slote seems to use this same view
that I hold (and that he clearly disagrees with, above) when
he argues against a view that he attributes to John Rawls.
According to Slote, Rawls’s principle of justice permits
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great differences in wealth in a population, so long as
those differences improve the lot of the worst off, even if
each is as deserving as everyone else. 208 If so, then
Rawls’s principles clearly conflict with PJD because in that
population, the goods are not distributed according to
desert. Slote notes that Rawls would defend his view by
appeal to what rational, non-envious people would choose in
the original position
,
209 but that Slote is unimpressed by
this defense:
Unless one already assumes that Rawls's original
position is one in which ideally just principles
would be chosen, he may be inclined to say that
this merely shows that people faced with (the
possibility of) a hard lot in life are willing to
tolerate certain injustices in order to achieve
certain results. And if one thinks that what
people deserve from society simply depends on
their conscientious efforts in behalf of society,
he might well think that the situation we are
discussing is unjust because goods are not
distributed in accordance with deserts, even
though people (in the original position ) might be
willing to accept that situation for reasons of
self-interest . 210
Except for the part about conscientious efforts
constituting the only desert base, this seems to be exactly
what I might argue, both against Rawls, and against Slote'
s
view that justice is desert plus consent. For it seems that
the upshot of Slote 's point is this: people may choose (and
so consent to) certain principles for self-interested
reasons, but this hardly shows that those principles are
just. Thus, it appears that Slote 's argument may succeed
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better than he would wish. In any case, I do not think that
consent alters justice in the way that Slote believes.
So, the two reasons that the lottery case appears
plausible are a confusion between procedural and
distributive justice, and the mistaken view that consent
alters justice. Otherwise, I find no plausibility in the
lottery case, and since what plausibility there is, is
chimerical, I do not see any reason to accept the lottery
case. Entitlement is not a desert base.
Conclusion
With VD4
,
I have answered the final objection that I
mentioned in Chapter Two, about the concept of desert being
too empty, too much of a mere appeal to disparate
intuitions, to provide the basis for a principle about
justice such as PJD. I have given a substantive principle
about the nature of desert that asserts some unity among the
desert bases. I have shown how this principle can account
for many of the commonly made desert claims, and defended it
against several objections.
The view that distributive justice is achieved in a
population when each member gets what she or he deserves is
augmented by the view that deserts are determined primarily
by virtuous and vicious actions. The virtuous and vicious
actions, in turn, are based on the Aristotelian conception
of the virtues and vices that I presented in Chapter Six.
Together, these elements constitute a plausible alternative
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to Rawls's principles of justice, and is not threatened by
any of his arguments that I presented in Chapter Two.
Of course, there is more to be done to provide a full
examination of PJD, but that work must be left for another
time. Here, it suffices to show that there is a plausible,
desert-based conception of justice where the appeal to
desert does not make the whole view unacceptably mysterious.
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instance, the problem of actual versus implied consent.
This point was mentioned by Fred Feldman in his seminar of
Spring 1994.
207. The view that mercy and justice always conflict is not
without controversy, but it is fairly plausible that they
can conflict. See H. Scott Hestevold, "Justice to Mercy,"
Philosophical and Phenomenological Research
,
46 (December
1985) : 281-91; George W. Rainbolt, "Mercy: An Independent,
Imperfect Virtue, " American Philosophical Quarterly , 27
(April 1990): 169-73; Alwynne Smart, "Mercy," Philosophy 43
(1968): 345-59; Claudia Card, "On Mercy, " Philosophical
Review 81 (1972): 182-207.
208. Slote, "Desert, Consent, and Justice," page 341.
209. See Chapter Two for a discussion of this.
210. Slote, "Desert, Consent, and Justice," page 342, my
italics
.
181
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristotle. Nicomanchean Ethics, in Introduction to
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House,
1947.
Card, Claudia. "On Mercy." The Philosophical Review 81
(April 1972), pages 182-207.
Chapman, John W., and Galston, William A., eds . Virtue:
NOMOS XXXIV. New York and London: New York University
Press, 1992.
Cupit, Geoffrey. Justice as Fittingness . Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996.
Edwards, Jonathan. The Nature of True Virtue. Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 1960.
Feinberg, Joel. Doing and Deserving. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1970.
Feldman, Fred. "Desert: Reconsideration of Some Received
Wisdom." Mind 104 (January 1995), pages 63-77
.
Feldman, Fred. "Adjusting Utility for Justice: A
Consequentialist Reply to the Objection from Justice."
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (September
1995), pages 567-585.
Foot, Philippa. Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral
Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1978.
Goodin, Robert E. "Negating Positive Desert Claims."
Political Theory 13 (November 1985), pages 575-598.
Hestevold, H. Scott. "Disjunctive Desert." American
Philosophical Quarterly 20 (July 1983), pages 357-363.
Hestevold, H. Scott. "Justice to Mercy." Philosphical and
Phenomenological Research 46 (December 1985), pages
281-291.
Hohfeld, W. N. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning. New Haven and London, 1964.
Hursthouse, Rosalind, and Lawrence, Gavin, and Quinn,
Warren. Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral
Theory , Essays in Honour of Philippa Foot. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995.
182
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,
translated by Paton, H. J. New York: Harper & Row,
1964 .
Kleinig, John. "The Concept of Desert." American
Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), pages 71-78.
Kruschwitz, Robert B., and Roberts, Robert C. The Virtues:
Contemporary Essays on Moral Character. Belmont:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1987.
Kushner, Harold S. When Bad Things Happen to Good People.
New York: Schocken Books, 1981.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue, 2nd Ed. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
Mcleod, James Owen. On Being Deserving. University of
Massachusetts Amherst Dissertation, 1995.
Miller, David. Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1976.
Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1962.
Nagel, Thomas. "Equal Treatment and Compensatory
_
Discrimination." Philosophy and Public Affairs 2
(Summer 1973), pages 348-363.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York:
Basic Books, 1974.
Perry, Ralph Barton. General Theory of Value. New York:
Longmans, Green and Company, 1926.
Perry, Ralph Barton. Realms of Value. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1954.
Pincoffs, Edmund L. Quandries and Virtues , Against
Reductionism in Ethics. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1986.
Rachels, James. "What People Deserve." In Justice and
Economic Distribution, eds. Arthur, John, and Shaw,
William H. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1978.
Rainbolt, George W. "Mercy, an Independent, Imperfect
Virtue." American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (April
1990), pages 169-173.
183
Rakowski, Eric. Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1971.
Ree, Paul. "Determinism and the Illusion of Moral
Responsibility." Reprinted in Introduction to
Philosophy, ed. Feldman, Fred. New York: McGraw Hill,
1994.
Remnick, David. "Kid Dynamite Blows Up." The New Yorker 73
(July 14, 1997), pages 46-59.
Ross, W. D. The Right and The Good. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1930.
Sadurski, Wojciech. Giving Desert its Due. Dordrecht: D.
Reidel Publishing, 1985.
Sellars, Wilfrid, and Hospers, John. Readings in Ethical
Theory, 2nd. ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1970.
Sher, George. Desert. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1987.
Simon, Yves R. The Definition of Moral Virtue, ed. Kuic,
Vukan. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.
Singer, Peter. "All Animals Are Equal." In Animal Rights
and Human Obligations, ed. Regan, Tom, and Singer,
Peter. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976.
Slote, Michael. From Morality to Virtue. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992.
Slote, Michael. "Desert, Consent, and Justice." Philosophy
& Public Affairs 2 (Summer 1973), pages 323-347.
Slote, Michael. Goods and Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1983.
Smart, Alwynne . "Mercy." Philosophy 43 (1968), pages 345-
59.
Sterba, James. The Demands of Justice. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1980.
Sterba, James.
Practice 3
"Justice as Desert." Social Theory and
(Spring 1974), pages 101-116.
184
Wallace, James D. Virtues and Vices. Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1978.
Young, Robert. "Egalitarianism and Personal Desert."
Ethics 102 (January 1992), pages 319-341.
Zaitchik, Alan. "On Deserving to Deserve." Philosophy and
Public Affairs 6 (Summer 1977), pages 370-388.
185

